Langit yang Teratur dan Pertanyaan tentang “Ultra”

Pada pertengahan Oktober 2026, langit Singapura memutih oleh asap kebakaran hutan dan lahan dari Sumatra dan Kalimantan, bursa Jakarta terguncang oleh rencana reklasifikasi MSCI, dan pada 24 Oktober SKK Migas mulai memangkas pasokan gas pipa ke Singapura. Dalam suasana semacam itu, publik Indonesia mudah membayangkan Singapura sebagai satu tubuh politik yang seragam, rasional, dingin, dan, bagi sebagian orang, nasionalis secara berlebihan. Pada tahun 2026, esai di KBA13 Insight berjudul Masa Depan Konfrontasi menuju Perang Terbuka Antara Singapura dan Indonesia (25 Oktober 2026), yang juga tercatat sebagai dokumen di Arsip dan Pustaka KBA13 Academy, merangkai tiga pemicu itu, yakni asap, saham, dan gas, ke dalam ingatan sejarah Konfrontasi 1963–1966 dan menawarkan skenario 2027–2030. Pertanyaan yang lahir dari situasi tersebut terdengar sederhana tetapi sesungguhnya rumit: mengapa ada aliran ultra-nasionalis dan ultra-konservatif di Singapura, dan seberapa besar pengaruhnya terhadap cara negara-kota itu memperlakukan tetangganya? Pertanyaan ini mengandung praanggapan bahwa arus “ultra” itu memang ada dan cukup kuat untuk dihitung. Telaah ini tidak menerima praanggapan tersebut begitu saja, melainkan mengujinya dengan memetakan seluruh aliran politik Singapura, dari partai berkuasa hingga pinggiran kekerasan, dan menimbang setiap label dengan bukti.

Telaah ini sengaja ditempatkan di samping tiga kajian Research Center yang terbit sehari sebelumnya dan tidak mengulang sudut pandangnya. Kajian Perang Narasi di Seberang Selat (27 Oktober 2026) menilai bahwa opini warganet Singapura tentang krisis Oktober bersifat organik dan tidak menemukan bukti operasi pengaruh negara Singapura; kajian itu juga telah membedah arsitektur hukum POFMA dan FICA secara rinci, sehingga telaah ini hanya merujuknya. Kajian Tangga Eskalasi di Selat Singapura membaca sikap Singapura sebagai legalisme yang lahir dari kerentanan dan menyusun tangga eskalasi hingga 2030. Adapun kajian Damai tetapi Berjarak menunjukkan bahwa garis pemisah utama masyarakat Singapura kini adalah kelas dan status kewarganegaraan, bukan lagi ras. Ketiganya menyisakan celah yang diakui sendiri: belum ada peta menyeluruh tentang aliran ideologis di Singapura, belum ada pembacaan atas forum daring seperti HardwareZone dan Reddit, dan belum ada data kuantitatif tentang sentimen nativis. Telaah ini mengisi celah itu.

Argumen yang dikembangkan berikut dapat diringkas sejak awal. Singapura memang menyimpan arus keras: nativisme ekonomi yang memusuhi pekerja asing dan perjanjian dagang, konservatisme moral-religius yang menolak perubahan norma seksual dan keluarga, serta segelintir remaja yang meradikalisasi diri melalui ideologi sayap kanan jauh dan gabungan ideologi kekerasan. Namun ketiganya tidak membentuk gerakan ultra yang terorganisasi. Sebabnya bukan semata represi, melainkan karena negara yang dibangun Partai Aksi Rakyat (PAP) sudah menduduki ruang ideologis yang di tempat lain diisi kanan radikal: negara itu sendiri konservatif secara komunitarian, nasionalis secara defensif, dan sangat cepat mengubah isu identitas menjadi isu keamanan. Lima belas bagian berikut menguraikan kerangka dan metode, inti ideologi PAP, peta elektoral dan oposisi, empat arus keras dan satu arus liberal, respons negara, penjelasan teoretis, suara para pemimpin, cermin Indonesia Oktober 2026, argumen tandingan, skenario, rekomendasi, dan keterbatasan.

Kerangka Analitis, Metode, dan Tingkat Keyakinan

Telaah ini membedakan tiga lapis yang kerap dicampuradukkan dalam perbincangan publik. Lapis pertama adalah ideologi, yaitu seperangkat gagasan tentang siapa yang termasuk bangsa, bagaimana masyarakat seharusnya diatur, dan nilai apa yang harus dipertahankan. Lapis kedua adalah retorika, yaitu cara aktor politik membingkai isu, misalnya ketika perdebatan tentang tenaga kerja asing diberi nada rasial. Lapis ketiga adalah organisasi, yaitu kendaraan yang membawa ideologi dan retorika ke arena politik: partai, kelompok masyarakat sipil, jaringan keagamaan, atau komunitas daring. Sebuah arus baru layak disebut “ultra” bila memenuhi setidaknya dua syarat dari tiga: memeluk gagasan eksklusif yang memusuhi kelompok luar secara menyeluruh, menolak tatanan konstitusional pluralis atau membenarkan pemaksaan, dan memiliki pembawa yang terorganisasi. Atas dasar itu, telaah ini tidak menyebut orang atau kelompok bernama sebagai “ultra” kecuali sumber resmi atau akademik mendukungnya; dalam kebanyakan kasus, istilah yang lebih tepat adalah “nativis”, “konservatif”, atau “populis”, dan setiap istilah itu dikaitkan dengan bukti tertentu.

Lensa teoretis pertama berasal dari karya Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2007), yang menjadi rujukan baku untuk mengenali kanan radikal populis. Pada tahun 2025, João Ferreira Dias dalam komentar di European Center for Populism Studies berjudul What Is the Ideology That Has Attained Social Hegemony? Let Us Call It Simply Nativism merangkum nativisme, dengan merujuk Mudde dan Rovira Kaltwasser, sebagai pandangan dunia yang membela populasi “asli” dari ancaman luar dan dalam, serta merumuskan populisme kanan radikal sebagai struktur rangkap tiga: pembelahan moral antara rakyat murni dan elite korup, pembelaan identitas nasional terhadap multikulturalisme, dan penentangan terhadap kiri. Lensa kedua adalah teori sekuritisasi Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, dan Jaap de Wilde. Ulasan CESRAN atas Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner, 1998) menegaskan bahwa sekuritisasi adalah tindak tutur yang berhasil bila khalayak menerima suatu isu sebagai “ancaman eksistensial” yang membenarkan tindakan darurat. Lensa ketiga berasal dari kesarjanaan Singapura sendiri: komunitarianisme Chua Beng Huat, kritik meritokrasi Kenneth Paul Tan, metafora “bangsa berpendingin udara” Cherian George, jaringan elite Michael Barr, dan teori partisipasi tanpa demokrasi Garry Rodan.

Secara metodologis, telaah ini memadukan analisis dokumen resmi (rilis pers Internal Security Department, Kementerian Dalam Negeri, Kementerian Pertahanan, dan ensiklopedia Perpustakaan Nasional), data survei (IPS Post-Election Survey 2025, World Values Survey 2020 komponen Singapura, Indikator Harmoni Ras dan Agama IPS-OnePeople.sg 2024, survei Ipsos 2022), audit komputasional atas lebih dari 31 juta unggahan daring, liputan media berkualitas, serta arsip kba13.com dan pustaka.kba13academy.com. Batas data adalah 28 Oktober 2026. Setiap penilaian diberi tingkat keyakinan. Keyakinan Tinggi diberikan bila temuan bertumpu pada beberapa sumber resmi atau survei yang konsisten; Sedang bila bertumpu pada satu sumber berkualitas atau inferensi yang wajar dari beberapa indikator; Rendah bila masuk akal tetapi bukti terbuka tipis. Satu catatan istilah perlu diberikan sejak awal: dalam survei pascapemilu IPS, kluster “Conservative” berarti pemilih yang cenderung mempertahankan status quo politik dan dominasi partai berkuasa, bukan konservatisme moral atau religius. Mencampuradukkan keduanya akan menghasilkan kesimpulan keliru tentang besarnya “konservatisme” di Singapura.

Inti Ideologis PAP: Pragmatisme, Meritokrasi, Multirasialisme, dan Narasi Kerentanan

Setiap peta aliran politik Singapura harus dimulai dari PAP, sebab partai yang berkuasa sejak 1959 itu bukan hanya satu pemain di antara banyak pemain, melainkan perancang lapangan permainan. Inti ideologinya paling jelas terbaca dalam dokumen Nilai Bersama. Ensiklopedia Perpustakaan Nasional Singapura, Infopedia, dalam entri tentang Shared Values, mencatat bahwa Goh Chok Tong pertama kali mengusulkan seperangkat nilai resmi pada 28 Oktober 1988, Presiden Wee Kim Wee mengulang seruan itu pada 9 Januari 1989, Buku Putih Nilai Bersama diajukan ke parlemen pada 2 Januari 1991, dan parlemen mengesahkannya pada 15 Januari 1991. Lima nilai itu ialah bangsa di atas komunitas dan masyarakat di atas diri, keluarga sebagai unit dasar masyarakat, dukungan komunitas dan penghormatan terhadap individu, konsensus bukan konflik, serta harmoni ras dan agama. Latar belakangnya adalah kecemasan elite bahwa warga bergeser menuju pandangan hidup yang, dalam kata-kata Wee, “more Westernised, individualistic, and self-centred”. Dokumen ini penting bagi telaah kita karena memperlihatkan bahwa konservatisme keluarga dan kecurigaan terhadap individualisme Barat bukan milik kelompok pinggiran, melainkan doktrin negara.

Pada tahun 2017, Chua Beng Huat dalam buku Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore (NUS Press) menunjukkan bahwa PAP membangun ideologi komunitarian non-Barat sebagai alternatif liberalisme dan mengujinya pada perumahan publik, multirasialisme, dan kapitalisme negara; ia juga mencatat terjadinya “liberalisasi ranah budaya” tanpa runtuhnya hegemoni partai. Pada tahun 2008, Kenneth Paul Tan dalam International Political Science Review berjudul Meritocracy and Elitism in a Global City: Ideological Shifts in Singapore berargumen bahwa meritokrasi adalah ideologi yang tidak stabil karena cita egaliternya berbenturan dengan kompetisi dan ganjaran, sehingga dalam praktik ia membenarkan elitisme dan pemerintahan teknokratis, dan ia memperkirakan kesenjangan pendapatan serta krisis global akan menggerusnya. Michael Barr dalam The Ruling Elite of Singapore (I.B. Tauris, 2014) menelusuri jaringan kekuasaan yang dibangun di sekitar Lee Kuan Yew, sedangkan Barr bersama Zlatko Skrbis dalam Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-building Project (NIAS Press, 2009) berpendapat bahwa proyek pembangunan bangsa yang dipimpin elite memungkinkan “versi Singapura dari etno-nasionalisme Tionghoa” mendominasi perdebatan tentang identitas nasional.

Unsur ketiga adalah narasi kerentanan, yaitu keyakinan bahwa negara kecil tanpa sumber daya alam hanya dapat bertahan melalui disiplin, persatuan, dan kewaspadaan. Kementerian Pertahanan Singapura dalam lembar fakta tentang evolusi Total Defence (15 Februari 2019) mencatat bahwa konsep itu diperkenalkan pada 1984 dengan mengacu pada model Swedia dan Swiss, menjadikan Pertahanan Psikologis sebagai intinya, dan pada 2019 menambahkan Pertahanan Digital sebagai pilar keenam. Kenneth Paul Tan dalam Singapore: Identity, Brand, Power (Cambridge University Press, 2018) menggambarkan negara yang memimpin penciptaan narasi nasional demi pertahanan diri dan mengandalkan smart power karena sumber dayanya terbatas. Garis kepemimpinan dari Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong, Lee Hsien Loong, hingga Lawrence Wong yang dilantik pada 15 Mei 2024 tidak mengubah inti ini. Cherian George dalam Singapore: The Air-Conditioned Nation (Landmark Books, 2000; edisi revisi 2020) menyebutnya politik kenyamanan dan kendali, sedangkan Garry Rodan dalam Participation without Democracy (Cornell University Press, 2018) menunjukkan bahwa saluran partisipasi konsultatif justru lebih banyak meredam kontestasi daripada memperluasnya. Konsekuensinya bagi telaah ini sangat menentukan: PAP sendiri adalah pembawa utama nasionalisme negara yang konservatif-komunitarian, sehingga arus kanan lain harus bersaing dengan negara di wilayah ideologis yang sama.

Peta Elektoral dan Spektrum Ideologis Oposisi

Dua pemilu terakhir memberi gambaran tentang batas-batas spektrum politik. Laporan Al Jazeera berjudul Singapore’s governing PAP returns to power but faces setback (11 Juli 2020) mencatat bahwa pada pemilu 10 Juli 2020 PAP meraih 83 dari 93 kursi dengan sekitar 61 persen suara, turun dari 70 persen pada 2015, sementara Partai Pekerja (WP) meraih 10 kursi, jumlah terbanyak yang pernah dimenangi oposisi; Lee Hsien Loong menyebutnya “not as strong a mandate as I hoped for but it’s a good mandate”. Pada pemilu 3 Mei 2025, laporan Mothership/MustShareNews berjudul GE2025: PAP forms Govt with landslide 65.57% of votes (4 Mei 2025) mencatat PAP memperoleh 65,57 persen suara dan 87 dari 97 kursi. Laporan The Edge Singapore berjudul PAP wins 87 of 97 seats, clinches 65.57% vote share menambahkan bahwa WP mempertahankan 10 kursi, Partai Kemajuan Singapura (PSP) kehilangan dua kursi anggota parlemen nonkonstituensi, dan partisipasi pemilih sebesar 92,47 persen merupakan titik terendah baru. Survei pascapemilu IPS, POPS(12) IPS Post-Election Survey 2025 (2.056 responden), menemukan biaya hidup dinilai sangat penting oleh 74 persen responden, 74 persen menganggap penting adanya oposisi terpilih, kredibilitas PAP turun 17 poin menjadi 69 persen, dan kredibilitas WP turun 14 poin menjadi 65 persen. Kluster “Conservative” naik dari 19 menjadi 25 persen dan “Pluralist” dari 22 menjadi 27 persen, sementara pemilih “Swing” menyusut dari 59 menjadi 48 persen; kenaikan kluster pro-status quo terutama terjadi pada usia 21–39 tahun.

Spektrum oposisi sempit dan sebagian besar berada di tengah. WP memosisikan diri sebagai penyeimbang pemerintah dengan agenda upah minimum, kesehatan terjangkau, dan pengawasan belanja negara, sebagaimana dirangkum dalam panduan partai politik Singapura 2026 oleh The Money Bees, yang juga mencatat porsi suara nasional WP 14,99 persen, PSP 4,88 persen, Red Dot United (RDU) 3,96 persen, Partai Demokratik Singapura (SDP) 3,72 persen, People’s Alliance for Reform (PAR) 2,51 persen, dan Partai Rakyat Singapura (SPP) 1,18 persen. PSP digambarkan sebagai partai yang cenderung ke tengah dengan fokus pada biaya hidup, pekerjaan bagi warga lokal, dan kebijakan CPF. SDP berkampanye soal keterjangkauan perumahan dan kebebasan berpendapat; analisis Ng Reuben di Global-is-Asian berjudul Why did some opposition parties see stinging losses at GE2025? (Mei 2025) mencatat Chee Soon Juan meraih hampir 47 persen di Sembawang West dan menyebut agenda kesehatan pembayar-tunggal SDP. Ringkasan ensiklopedis tentang Red Dot United menyebut partai yang didirikan pada 26 Mei 2020 oleh Ravi Philemon dan Michelle Lee itu berhaluan sosial-demokrat progresif kiri-tengah.

Di sisi lain spektrum terdapat partai-partai kecil yang memakai bahasa populis. Ringkasan ensiklopedis tentang Peoples Voice mencatat bahwa partai pimpinan Lim Tean itu didaftarkan pada Oktober 2018, dikategorikan sebagai populis, meraih 2,37 persen suara nasional pada 2020, dan sejak Juni 2023 bergabung dalam aliansi PAR. Sebelumnya, Malay Mail dalam laporan Singapore opposition party SingFirst dissolved (25 Juni 2020) mencatat bahwa partai bernama Singaporeans First, didirikan Tan Jee Say pada Agustus 2014, dibubarkan menjelang pemilu 2020 setelah kalah di dua GRC pada 2015. Nama partai itu sendiri merangkum slogan nasionalisme ekonomi yang populer sejak 2011, tetapi kiprah elektoralnya pendek. Pemungutan suara tentang pencabutan Pasal 377A pada 2022 memperlihatkan bahwa garis pembelah moral memotong partai-partai, bukan memisahkan mereka: dua anggota WP menolak pencabutan, dua anggota WP lain abstain atas amandemen konstitusi, dan dua anggota PSP menolak amandemen tersebut. Penilaian bagian ini adalah bahwa tidak ada partai bersuara signifikan di Singapura yang mengusung program ultra-nasionalis atau ultra-konservatif; retorika nativis memang muncul pada partai pinggiran dan pada isu tertentu di partai menengah, tetapi daya elektoralnya kecil (keyakinan Tinggi).

Nativisme dan Nasionalisme Ekonomi: dari Hong Lim hingga CECA

Arus paling mendekati kanan radikal di Singapura adalah nativisme ekonomi, yaitu keyakinan bahwa warga lokal dirugikan oleh arus pendatang dan perjanjian dagang. Pada tahun 2015, J. Lim dalam Japanese Journal of Political Science berjudul Popular nationalism in the wake of the 2011 national elections in Singapore membedakan nasionalisme negara yang dipromosikan PAP, berpusat pada pertumbuhan ekonomi dan kemenangan partai atas kolonialisme, kekerasan rasial, dan komunisme, dari nasionalisme populer yang tumbuh dari bawah dan merasa identitas nasional terancam oleh kebijakan imigrasi liberal, khususnya pendatang yang dilabeli pemerintah sebagai foreign talent. Puncak publik arus ini terjadi dua tahun kemudian. Laporan Al Jazeera berjudul Singaporeans protest over population plan (16 Februari 2013) mencatat sedikitnya 4.000 orang berkumpul di Hong Lim Park menentang Buku Putih Kependudukan yang memproyeksikan populasi dapat tumbuh dari 5,3 juta menjadi 6,9 juta pada 2030, terutama melalui pekerja asing. Penyelenggaranya, Gilbert Goh, meminta pemerintah meninjau ulang kebijakan itu, dan perencana keuangan Leong Sze Hian berkata bahwa negara tidak dapat mendatangkan orang asing untuk bersaing dengan rakyatnya sendiri sambil sedikit sekali merawat rakyat itu.

Akhir tahun yang sama, kerusuhan Little India menguji apakah ketegangan pendatang-lokal akan berubah menjadi kekerasan komunal. Malay Mail dalam laporan Little India riot was sparked off by accident, inquiry panel says (1 Juli 2014) mencatat bahwa sekitar 400 perusuh terlibat pada 8 Desember 2013 setelah seorang warga India tewas tertabrak bus. Komite penyelidikan menolak tafsir bahwa kerusuhan lahir dari ketidakpuasan pekerja asing atas kondisi kerja dan menegaskan bahwa upaya membingkainya sebagai isu rasial sama sekali tidak berdasar, sambil menyebut alkohol sebagai faktor penyumbang utama. Respons ini khas: negara membingkai peristiwa sebagai soal ketertiban umum, bukan keluhan struktural, sehingga ruang bagi mobilisasi nativis di sekitar peristiwa itu dipersempit. Gelombang berikutnya berpusat pada CECA, Perjanjian Kerja Sama Ekonomi Komprehensif dengan India. Mothership dalam laporan Ong Ye Kung agrees with Pritam Singh that early information on nativist issues could help quell falsehoods early (6 Juli 2021) mencatat Menteri Ong Ye Kung menegaskan bahwa “CECA Chapter 9 does not allow an unfettered inflow of Indian nationals” dan meminta PSP menarik tuduhannya, sementara Pritam Singh dari WP menyebut perlunya keterbukaan data untuk meredam perbincangan yang bergeser ke xenofobia atau nativisme. Mothership kembali mencatat dalam laporan PSP’s anti-CECA campaign has ‘strongly racist & xenophobic undertones’: Lawrence Wong (14 September 2021) bahwa Lawrence Wong menilai mosi PSP bernada rasis dan xenofobik dan meminta partai itu berhenti mengeksploitasi kecemasan warga; PSP sendiri menolak tuduhan itu; MustShareNews dalam laporan PSP Refutes Ong Ye Kung’s Claims That They Contributed To Racist Sentiments, Demands Apology (2 Juli 2021) mengutip Sekretaris Jenderal PSP Francis Yuen bahwa perdebatan itu menyangkut pekerja profesional, manajer, eksekutif, dan teknisi, bukan ketegangan rasial.

Pada Mei 2021, perdebatan itu bersentuhan dengan kekerasan nyata. Malay Mail dalam laporan Singapore PM Lee and several ministers speak out against alleged racist attack (11 Mei 2021) mencatat serangan terhadap seorang perempuan keturunan India yang dikecam Lee Hsien Loong dan sejumlah menteri. Pada tahun 2022, sosiolog Laavanya Kathiravelu dalam esai di Academia.sg berjudul Doubly minoritised: Indianness in Singapore and xenophobia as racism berargumen bahwa warna kulit menjadi penanda “orang luar” ketika batas antara warga dan pendatang kabur, dan bahwa kemarahan terhadap CECA juga diarahkan kepada pemerintah yang dianggap mengistimewakan kelompok tertentu. Ukuran arus ini di ranah daring kini dapat diperkirakan. Emilio Ferrara dalam audit komputasional berjudul Cultural Targets, Structural Frames, Binding Morals: A Cross-Lingual Audit of Online Hate in Multicultural Singapore menganalisis 31.032.005 butir dari 231 halaman Facebook, 23 subreddit, dan 16 kanal YouTube berorientasi Singapura pada 2025. Dari 3.323 komentar yang terkonfirmasi sebagai ujaran kebencian, 31 persen memuat sikap anti-imigrasi eksplisit; sikap itu hadir pada 98–99 persen kebencian terhadap sasaran CECA dan pekerja migran, dan kebencian anti-CECA mengalami amplifikasi paling tinggi. Penilaian bagian ini: nativisme ekonomi adalah arus nyata dengan ideologi eksklusif dan retorika yang teramplifikasi (keyakinan Tinggi), tetapi pembawa organisasionalnya lemah dan ukurannya relatif kecil dibanding volume wacana daring secara keseluruhan (keyakinan Sedang, mengingat Ferrara sendiri memperingatkan bahwa pola relatif lebih andal daripada angka prevalensi absolut).

Konservatisme Religius dan Moral: Pasal 377A dan Sesudahnya

Arus kedua yang kerap disebut “ultra-konservatif” adalah konservatisme moral-religius. Basis sosialnya luas. Liputan The Straits Times yang diarsipkan IPS berjudul Singapore still conservative on moral, sexuality issues but more liberal since 2002 (3 Februari 2021), berdasarkan World Values Survey 2020 dengan lebih dari 2.000 responden, mencatat 59,3 persen responden menilai homoseksualitas “tidak pernah atau jarang dapat dibenarkan”, dengan angka 75,2 persen di kalangan Muslim, sementara arti penting agama menurun dari sekitar 76 persen pada 2002 dan 2012 menjadi 65,3 persen. Malay Mail dalam laporan Left or right? IPS survey finds almost half of Singaporeans undecided (3 Februari 2021) menambahkan bahwa 30,6 persen responden menempatkan diri di kiri dan 20,8 persen di kanan, dengan 42,7 persen kelompok usia 21–35 tahun di kiri dan 31,8 persen kelompok di atas 65 tahun di kanan. Arah perubahan juga terlihat dalam survei Ipsos berjudul Attitudes towards same-sex relationships shift towards greater inclusivity in Singapore (21 Juni 2022): dukungan untuk mempertahankan Pasal 377A turun dari 55 persen pada 2018 menjadi 44 persen pada 2022, sementara penolakan naik dari 12 menjadi 20 persen.

Negara menavigasi perubahan itu dengan kompromi yang sekaligus konservatif. Malay Mail dalam laporan Singapore will decriminalise sex between men, says PM Lee (21 Agustus 2022) mengutip Lee Hsien Loong dalam Rapat Umum Hari Nasional bahwa pencabutan adalah langkah yang benar, disertai janji melindungi definisi perkawinan sebagai ikatan laki-laki dan perempuan dari gugatan konstitusional. Malay Mail dalam laporan Singapore Parliament repeals Section 377A, approves constitutional change (30 November 2022) mencatat bahwa pada 29 November 2022 pencabutan disahkan dengan 93 suara setuju dan 3 menolak, sedangkan Pasal 156 konstitusi yang baru disahkan dengan 85 suara setuju, 2 menolak, dan 2 abstain. Reaksi lembaga agama beragam. Mothership dalam laporan Disappointment, acceptance, relief: 34 religious, social, & LGBTQ+ groups’ responses to 377A repeal (22 Agustus 2022) mencatat Dewan Gereja Nasional menerima pencabutan sambil menilainya tidak perlu, Keuskupan Agung Katolik menegaskan tidak berusaha mengkriminalkan kelompok LGBTQ, Aliansi Gereja Pentakosta dan Karismatik yang mewakili lebih dari 80 gereja menyebutnya “an extremely regrettable decision”, sedangkan MUIS menegaskan pandangan Islam tentang perkawinan sekaligus menyatakan bahwa setiap orang, apa pun orientasi seksualnya, harus merasa aman.

Di luar lembaga resmi, konservatisme moral dimobilisasi oleh kelompok sipil. Pada 30 Juli 2022, Kementerian Dalam Negeri dalam jawaban atas pertanyaan media tentang Protect Singapore Townhall menyatakan bahwa kelompok Protect Singapore tidak melanggar hukum dan bahwa pemerintah akan turun tangan bila ada hasutan atau serangan dari pihak mana pun. Dua tahun kemudian, Malay Mail dalam laporan In Singapore, politicians show up for Pink Dot despite scorecard grading their ‘family values’ (29 Juni 2024) mencatat kelompok itu menerbitkan kartu nilai yang menilai anggota parlemen berdasarkan sikap terhadap isu LGBTQ. Akar mobilisasi ini lebih tua: Global Voices dalam laporan Singapore’s ‘Pink Dot’ LGBT Rights Rally Was Bigger Than Ever, Despite #WearWhite Opponents (4 Juli 2014) mencatat bahwa pendidik Islam Noor Deros menggagas kampanye Wear White dan pendeta Lawrence Khong menggelar ibadah keluarga yang dihadiri sekitar 6.400 orang. Nama Noor Deros muncul kembali pada pemilu 2025. South China Morning Post dalam laporan Singapore doubles down on zero tolerance for identity politics, foreign interference (14 Oktober 2025) mencatat bahwa ia, bersama anggota PAS Malaysia, mendukung kandidat WP Faisal Manap di Tampines, dan Kementerian Dalam Negeri dalam tanggapan atas pernyataan PAS 15 Oktober 2025 menyebutnya “a serious interference in Singapore’s elections”. Penilaian bagian ini: konservatisme moral-religius adalah arus terbesar secara sosial dan terlembaga, tetapi bekerja melalui petisi, forum, dan lobi legal; label “ultra” tidak tepat untuk lembaga-lembaga ini, sementara dimensi transnasional pada pemilu 2025 lebih tepat dibaca sebagai upaya memobilisasi suara berdasarkan agama yang ditolak negara dan juga oleh WP (keyakinan Tinggi).

Pinggiran Kekerasan: Radikalisasi Diri Sayap Kanan Jauh di Kalangan Remaja

Jika ada arus yang secara ideologis pantas disebut ekstrem, ia ditemukan di pinggiran kekerasan, bukan di partai atau gereja. Pada 27 Januari 2021, Internal Security Department dalam rilis Detention of Singaporean youth who intended to attack Muslims on the anniversary of Christchurch attacks in New Zealand mengumumkan penahanan seorang pelajar Kristen Protestan keturunan India berusia 16 tahun yang berencana menyerang Masjid Assyafaah dan Masjid Yusof Ishak dengan parang pada 15 Maret 2021, tepat pada peringatan serangan Christchurch. ISD menyebutnya tahanan pertama yang terinspirasi ideologi ekstremis sayap kanan, didorong antipati kuat terhadap Islam dan ketertarikan pada kekerasan. Pada 10 Februari 2025, Malay Mail dalam laporan Singapore locks up self-radicalised ‘East Asian supremacist’ mencatat penahanan Nick Lee Xing Qiu, 18 tahun, yang memuja pelaku Christchurch, mengoleksi simbol neo-Nazi, menganut teori Great Replacement, dan berharap memicu “perang ras” di Singapura.

Polanya berlanjut. ISD dalam rilis Issuance of Orders under the ISA against two self-radicalised Singaporean youths (2 April 2025) mengumumkan penahanan seorang remaja 17 tahun yang mengidentifikasi diri sebagai “East Asian Supremacist”, membenci Melayu dan Muslim, berencana menyerang masjid dengan senjata api sambil menyiarkannya secara langsung, dan merupakan kontak daring Nick Lee. Malay Mail dalam laporan In first case, Singapore detains teen who idolised Hitler, bin Laden and Kim Jong-il (9 September 2025) mencatat kasus remaja 14 tahun dengan campuran ideologi jihadis, sayap kanan jauh, dan kekaguman pada rezim Korea Utara, yang dikenai perintah pembatasan. ISD dalam rilis Issuance of Orders of Detention under the ISA against three self-radicalised Singaporean youths (27 Juli 2026) kemudian mengumumkan bahwa seorang siswa 14 tahun, tahanan ISA termuda sepanjang sejarah, menganut apa yang disebut Composite Violent Extremism: dukungan pada ISIS bercampur pandangan anti-Semit, neo-Nazi, akselerasionisme Atomwaffen Division, dan supremasi kulit putih. Ia menyusun manifesto 21 halaman dan merencanakan penikaman massal di sekolahnya, dipengaruhi antara lain oleh permainan tembak-menembak di Roblox yang merekonstruksi penembakan sekolah.

Data agregat menempatkan kasus-kasus ini dalam proporsi. ISD dalam Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2025 (29 Juli 2025) mencatat 17 pemuda berusia 20 tahun ke bawah ditangani dengan ISA sejak 2015, dua belas di antaranya dalam lima tahun terakhir, dan sembilan berniat menyerang di dalam negeri. Rilis Juli 2026 menyebut lebih dari separuh dari 23 pemuda yang ditangani dalam sekitar satu dasawarsa berniat menyerang Singapura, dan Malay Mail dalam laporan Singapore terror threat remains high as Middle East conflicts fuel radicalisation (10 September 2026) mengutip laporan ancaman 2026 bahwa kasus radikalisasi pemuda naik dari empat (2017–2021) menjadi lima belas (sejak 2022), dengan konflik Israel–Palestina dan perang AS–Israel dengan Iran meningkatkan ketegangan antarkomunitas. Mayoritas kasus pemuda tetap terkait ISIS; kasus sayap kanan jauh merupakan minoritas yang penting karena sasarannya hampir selalu Muslim dan Melayu, pelakunya berasal dari beragam latar etnis dan agama, dan inspirasinya diimpor dari ekosistem daring global. Penilaian bagian ini: ekstremisme sayap kanan jauh di Singapura nyata secara ideologis dan bersifat ultra dalam arti penuh, tetapi tampil sebagai radikalisasi diri individual tanpa organisasi lokal yang terdokumentasi dalam sumber terbuka (keyakinan Tinggi), dengan tren usia yang makin muda (keyakinan Tinggi).

Faktor Tiongkok, Kecemasan Sinisisasi, dan Etno-nasionalisme Tionghoa

Arus keempat lebih sulit dipetakan karena bergerak di dua arah sekaligus. Di satu sisi terdapat kritik akademik bahwa nasionalisme resmi Singapura condong ke identitas Tionghoa. Barr dan Skrbis, sebagaimana disebut di atas, berbicara tentang versi Singapura dari etno-nasionalisme Tionghoa yang mendominasi perdebatan identitas. Data survei mengisyaratkan bahwa pengalaman minoritas memang berbeda. Liputan CNA yang diarsipkan IPS berjudul Trust between racial groups in Singapore grows but stereotyping rises (3 Februari 2025), berdasarkan survei IPS-OnePeople.sg terhadap 4.000 penduduk pada April–Agustus 2024, mencatat bahwa 18,4 persen responden Melayu dan 16,7 persen responden India melaporkan diskriminasi saat melamar kerja atau promosi, dibanding 3,7 persen responden Tionghoa; 43,5 persen mengaku membuat asumsi berdasarkan ras, naik dari 35,2 persen pada 2018; tetapi 65,4 persen menilai harmoni ras dan agama tinggi atau sangat tinggi dan ketidakpercayaan antarkelompok turun dari 42,7 persen pada 2013 menjadi 27,2 persen.

Di sisi lain terdapat kecemasan negara terhadap pengaruh Republik Rakyat Tiongkok, yang ditangani melalui instrumen keamanan. Kementerian Dalam Negeri dalam rilis Cancellation of Singapore Permanent Residence Status: Huang Jing and Yang Xiuping (Agustus 2017) menyebut akademisi Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy itu sebagai “agent of influence of a foreign country” yang berupaya memengaruhi kebijakan luar negeri Singapura, tanpa menyebut nama negara tersebut. Kementerian yang sama dalam pemberitahuan Intended Designation of Chan Man Ping Philip as Politically Significant Person under FICA (2 Februari 2024) menilai pengusaha naturalisasi itu telah menunjukkan “susceptibility to be influenced by foreign actors”, dan menetapkannya secara resmi pada 26 Februari 2024. Undang-undang harmoni ras yang berlaku sejak September 2026 juga mewajibkan sekitar 300 perkumpulan klan dan bisnis berbasis ras melaporkan donasi dan afiliasi asing mulai April 2028.

Di ruang daring, sentimen terhadap pendatang dari Tiongkok daratan justru banyak disuarakan oleh warga keturunan Tionghoa sendiri. Audit Ferrara mencatat bahwa diskursus berbahasa Mandarin berpusat pada poros warga Tionghoa-Singapura versus warga RRT, narasi anti-RRT hadir pada 15 persen kebencian berbahasa Inggris dan 16 persen berbahasa Mandarin, dan 59 persen kebencian terhadap sasaran RRT memuat sikap anti-imigrasi. Dengan demikian, “faktor Tiongkok” di Singapura tidak dapat dibaca sebagai satu arus chauvinis yang seragam. Terdapat kritik akademik tentang bias Tionghoa dalam proyek kebangsaan, ada pengawasan negara terhadap jalur pengaruh RRT, dan ada nativisme lokal yang menyasar pendatang RRT. Bagi pembaca Indonesia, temuan ini relevan karena wacana yang membayangkan Singapura sebagai “negara Tionghoa” yang seragam, sebagaimana diperingatkan kajian Tangga Eskalasi, mengabaikan pembelahan internal tersebut. Pada tahun 2026, buku The Beijing Factor in Southeast Asia yang tercatat di Arsip dan Pustaka KBA13 Academy juga menegaskan bahwa kehadiran kekuatan Tiongkok tidak otomatis berarti kendali atau kepatuhan politik negara-negara kawasan. Penilaian bagian ini: tidak ada gerakan chauvinis Tionghoa yang terorganisasi (keyakinan Sedang), sedangkan kecemasan terhadap pengaruh RRT dikelola terutama sebagai isu keamanan negara (keyakinan Tinggi).

Arus Liberal-Progresif dan Ekologi Ruang Daring

Peta yang hanya memuat arus keras akan menyesatkan, sebab arus liberal-progresif juga tumbuh dan menjadi lawan langsung konservatisme moral. Global Voices dalam laporan yang sama tentang Pink Dot 2014 mencatat lebih dari 26.000 orang berkumpul di Hong Lim Park pada 28 Juni 2014, kehadiran terbesar sejak acara pertama pada 2009, justru pada tahun kampanye Wear White. Satu dasawarsa kemudian, sejumlah anggota parlemen dari PAP, WP, PSP, dan RDU hadir di Pink Dot 2024 meskipun ada kartu nilai Protect Singapore; Malay Mail mengutip anggota parlemen PAP Eric Chua bahwa melayani rakyat Singapura hari ini berarti melayani masyarakat yang “very pluralistic”, dan anggota parlemen PAP Darryl David mempertanyakan tujuan memeringkat anggota parlemen berdasarkan sikap mereka. Kluster “Pluralist” dalam survei IPS 2025 dan kecenderungan kaum muda menempatkan diri di kiri dalam World Values Survey 2020 memperlihatkan basis sosial arus ini, meskipun pluralisme politik dan liberalisme moral tidak selalu bertumpang tindih.

Ruang gerak arus liberal juga dibatasi negara, dan pembatasan itu berlaku simetris terhadap semua pihak yang dianggap membuka pintu pengaruh asing. Global Voices dalam laporan Singapore’s The Online Citizen news website stops operating after government suspends its license (18 September 2021) mencatat bahwa IMDA menangguhkan lisensi portal kritis itu karena dinilai gagal mengungkap penyandang dananya, dengan alasan bahwa situs politik tidak boleh “coming under the influence of foreign entities or funding”. Kasus Huang Jing pada 2017 memperlihatkan bahwa dunia akademik pun tidak berada di luar jangkauan logika keamanan. Cherian George sejak 2000 menyebut pola ini sebagai pertukaran antara kenyamanan dan kendali, dan edisi revisi bukunya pada 2020 menandakan bahwa metafora itu masih relevan dua dasawarsa kemudian.

Ekologi daring menjadi arena tempat semua arus bertemu. Audit Ferrara memperlihatkan bahwa diskursus berbahasa Inggris luas dan didominasi sasaran Muslim, RRT, dan LGBTQ, diskursus berbahasa Melayu berpusat pada agama dan LGBTQ, sedangkan kebencian hampir seluruhnya digerakkan oleh rasa jijik (94–96 persen). Penting dicatat bahwa korpus itu tidak memuat HardwareZone, forum daring lokal yang populer di kalangan warganet Singapura, dan tidak ada data sistematis terbuka tentang TikTok; kedua celah ini harus dibaca sebagai batas pengetahuan, bukan sebagai bukti ketiadaan. Pada tahun 2025, esai di KBA13 Insight berjudul Ekosistem Blog Singapura: Gaya Hidup, Politik, dan Proyeksi Nasionalisme 2050 menggambarkan ekosistem tempat nasionalisme banal, satire, dan kritik terhadap pemerintah sendiri hidup berdampingan, dan menunjukkan bahwa identitas nasional Singapura tetap kuat karena dirawat melalui nasionalisme keseharian. Gambaran itu sejalan dengan reaksi daring pada Oktober 2026 yang diuraikan di Bagian XIII. Penilaian bagian ini: arus liberal-progresif tumbuh secara sosial dan mulai mendapat pengakuan simbolik dari politisi lintas partai (keyakinan Sedang), tetapi media alternatifnya rentan terhadap regulasi pengaruh asing (keyakinan Tinggi).

Arsitektur Respons Negara dan Logika Sekuritisasi

Respons negara terhadap semua arus di atas mengikuti satu tata bahasa: isu identitas diperlakukan sebagai isu keamanan sebelum sempat menjadi isu politik. Arsitektur POFMA dan FICA telah diuraikan dalam kajian Perang Narasi, sehingga di sini cukup dicatat dua instrumen yang paling langsung berkaitan dengan arus nativis dan religius. Kementerian Dalam Negeri dalam rilis Commencement of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony (Amendment) Act 2019 menjelaskan bahwa sejak 1 November 2022 perintah pembatasan berlaku seketika dan menjangkau komunikasi daring, kelompok agama wajib dipimpin warga negara atau penduduk tetap, donasi asing tunggal sebesar S$10.000 atau lebih wajib dilaporkan, dan pelanggar dapat menempuh Inisiatif Pemulihan Komunitas. Mothership dalam laporan New law to safeguard racial harmony (September 2026) mencatat bahwa Undang-Undang Pemeliharaan Harmoni Rasial yang disahkan pada 4 Februari 2025 mulai berlaku pada 15 September 2026, membentuk Dewan Kepresidenan untuk Harmoni Ras dan Agama di bawah mantan hakim agung Choo Han Teck, memberi menteri kewenangan menerbitkan perintah pembatasan terhadap konten yang merugikan harmoni rasial, dan menggantikan Pasal 298 dan 298A KUHP. Pada pemilu 2025, pemerintah juga memerintahkan pemblokiran unggahan warga asing yang dinilai berusaha memengaruhi pemilih berdasarkan agama.

Dibaca dengan lensa sekuritisasi, pola ini memiliki dua wajah. Wajah pertama adalah pencegahan: dengan menyatakan bahwa politik ras dan agama merupakan ancaman eksistensial bagi negara multirasial yang kecil, negara mencegah arus nativis dan religius berubah menjadi organisasi politik yang mengusung identitas. Penerimaan khalayak, syarat keberhasilan sekuritisasi menurut Buzan dan kawan-kawan, tampak cukup tinggi; survei IPS 2025 mencatat 84 persen pemilih merasa bebas memilih sesuai kehendaknya, dan sebagian besar warga menilai harmoni ras dan agama tinggi. Wajah kedua adalah penyempitan: perangkat yang sama membatasi media alternatif dan aktivisme sipil, sehingga warga yang tidak puas memiliki lebih sedikit saluran terbuka dan lebih mudah mengekspresikan kemarahan di forum anonim. Rumusan Kementerian Dalam Negeri bahwa negara akan bertindak terhadap hasutan “dari pihak mana pun” menunjukkan bahwa sekuritisasi ini dirancang simetris, menempatkan negara sebagai wasit di atas semua arus, bukan sebagai pendukung salah satu arus. Tabel berikut merangkum peta aliran beserta tingkat keyakinan penilaiannya.

Mengapa Arus Keras Muncul, dan Mengapa Ia Tetap Kerdil: Uji Mudde

Pertanyaan “mengapa” memerlukan jawaban berlapis. Lapis pertama bersifat struktural: keterbukaan ekonomi Singapura menuntut arus tenaga kerja asing yang besar. Kajian Damai tetapi Berjarak mengutip data Kementerian Tenaga Kerja bahwa pada Juni 2026 terdapat 1.655.900 pekerja asing, sehingga persaingan kerja, perumahan, dan ruang publik menjadi pengalaman sehari-hari, bukan abstraksi. Lapis kedua bersifat ideologis dan paradoksal: narasi kerentanan yang diajarkan negara sejak 1984 menanamkan kewaspadaan terhadap ancaman, dan ketika ancaman itu tidak lagi digambarkan sebagai tentara asing melainkan pendatang yang bersaing, nasionalisme defensif dapat bergeser menjadi nativisme. Inilah yang ditangkap Lim sebagai munculnya nasionalisme populer setelah 2011. Lapis ketiga adalah ketegangan meritokrasi yang diramalkan Tan pada 2008: ketika ganjaran terkonsentrasi dan kesenjangan melebar, kelas menengah yang cemas mencari kambing hitam di luar, dan pendatang profesional menjadi sasaran yang terlihat. Lapis keempat adalah konservatisme moral yang dilegitimasi negara sendiri melalui Nilai Bersama dan definisi keluarga tradisional, sehingga kelompok religius merasa sedang membela doktrin resmi ketika menolak perubahan. Lapis kelima adalah globalisasi ekosistem ekstremisme daring, dari manifesto Christchurch hingga subkultur Atomwaffen, yang menjangkau remaja Singapura tanpa perlu organisasi lokal, dan diperparah oleh konflik Timur Tengah sebagaimana dicatat laporan ancaman 2026.

Mengapa arus itu tetap kerdil? Uji Mudde memberikan jawaban yang tajam. Unsur nativisme hadir, terutama dalam wacana daring dan kampanye anti-CECA. Unsur otoritarianisme, yaitu tuntutan akan ketertiban dan hukuman keras, sudah dipenuhi oleh negara sendiri; tidak ada ruang bagi penantang yang menjanjikan lebih banyak ketertiban daripada negara yang paling tertib di kawasan. Unsur populisme, yaitu pembelahan antara rakyat murni dan elite korup, lemah karena reputasi integritas negara dan karena oposisi utama memilih bahasa penyeimbang yang moderat, bukan bahasa anti-elite. Partai yang dikategorikan populis, seperti Peoples Voice, hanya meraih 2,37 persen suara nasional pada 2020. Hasilnya adalah konfigurasi yang dapat disebut nativisme tanpa partai kanan radikal. Chua Beng Huat membantu menjelaskan mengapa: komunitarianisme negara telah menyerap konservatisme sosial ke dalam doktrin resmi, sehingga kanan radikal kehilangan monopoli atas nilai keluarga dan bangsa. Rodan menambahkan bahwa saluran partisipasi konsultatif menyedot keluhan sebelum menjadi kontestasi, dan George menunjukkan bahwa warga menukar sebagian kebebasan dengan kenyamanan yang nyata.

Kesimpulan ini tidak berarti arus keras dapat diabaikan. Ia berarti bahwa arus itu bekerja dengan cara berbeda dari kanan radikal Eropa. Alih-alih membangun partai, ia menekan agenda melalui opini daring yang teramplifikasi, memaksa pemerintah memperketat kebijakan tenaga kerja asing, dan sesekali menembus partai oposisi menengah dalam bentuk retorika. Alih-alih membangun gerakan jalanan, konservatisme moral memilih jalur lobi dan memperoleh hasil konstitusional berupa Pasal 156. Alih-alih membangun milisi, ekstremisme sayap kanan jauh tampil sebagai remaja yang menyendiri di depan layar. Ketiganya juga saling berbeda dalam sasarannya: nativisme menyasar pendatang India dan RRT serta pekerja migran, konservatisme moral menyasar perubahan norma seksual, dan ekstremisme kekerasan menyasar Muslim dan Melayu. Tidak ada satu “kubu ultra” yang menyatukan ketiganya. Penilaian ini diberi keyakinan Sedang hingga Tinggi: Tinggi untuk ketiadaan partai kanan radikal yang signifikan, Sedang untuk mekanisme penyerapan, karena hubungan kausal antara ideologi negara dan kerdilnya arus keras bersifat inferensial.

Kata Para Pemimpin

Suara para pemimpin Singapura memperlihatkan bagaimana negara menarik garis batas bagi arus-arus di atas. Tentang konservatisme moral, Lee Hsien Loong dalam Rapat Umum Hari Nasional 21 Agustus 2022, sebagaimana dikutip Malay Mail, berkata: “I believe this is the right thing to do, and something that most Singaporeans will now accept”, lalu menegaskan bahwa “marriage should be between a man and a woman” dan bahwa negara akan melindungi definisi itu dari gugatan di pengadilan. Kalimat-kalimat ini memperlihatkan kompromi khas PAP: melonggarkan hukum pidana sambil mengunci norma keluarga dalam konstitusi. Tentang nativisme, Lawrence Wong pada 14 September 2021 menilai mosi PSP tentang CECA memiliki “strong racist and xenophobic undertones” dan meminta partai itu “refrain from exploiting Singaporeans’ anxieties for your own political gain”. Setelah serangan rasis Mei 2021, Menteri Grace Fu menulis “Racism is unacceptable. So is xenophobia”, sementara Lee Hsien Loong menyatakan bahwa tidak ada tempat bagi perilaku semacam itu di Singapura.

Tentang politik identitas dan campur tangan asing, laporan PTI yang dimuat The Week berjudul Singapore’s multiracial ideals still ‘work in progress’: Minister Shanmugam (14 Oktober 2025) mencatat K. Shanmugam memperingatkan bahwa bila pemimpin masa depan merangkul politik identitas, jalan itu akan menjadi “one-way street to ruin”, dan bahwa Singapura tidak lebih stabil daripada negara lain sebelum hubungan komunal di sana memburuk. Kementerian Dalam Negeri dalam tanggapan atas PAS menegaskan “It is not for foreign entities or individuals to tell Singaporeans how to vote”. Pada 4 Juli 2026, Malay Mail dalam laporan Singapore PM Lawrence Wong champions diversity in PAP ranks mencatat Wong mengajak kaum muda untuk “widen the circle” dan menegaskan bahwa Singapura tidak sanggup menanggung politik terpolarisasi seperti di tempat lain. Tentang Indonesia, Malay Mail dalam laporan ‘It’s not right to say this’: Singapore senior minister rebukes Indonesian official’s oxygen remark (19 Oktober 2026) mencatat Shanmugam menolak klaim seorang pejabat Indonesia bahwa oksigen Singapura berasal dari hutan Indonesia, menegaskan kesiapan bertindak berdasarkan Undang-Undang Polusi Asap Lintas Batas, tetapi juga memuji langkah Presiden Prabowo dan menyatakan bahwa rakyat Indonesia sendirilah yang paling menderita. Dari pihak Indonesia, Eco-Business dalam laporan Indonesia signals gas export curbs for countries that do not ‘respect’ it (22 Oktober 2026) mengutip Bahlil Lahadalia: “I will not hesitate to consider halting exports to countries that disrespect Indonesia”, dan Presiden Prabowo: “For certain countries that like to insult the Indonesian nation, in time we will reveal the companies.”

Cermin Indonesia: Bagaimana Arus Nasionalis Singapura Bereaksi terhadap Jakarta, Oktober 2026

Krisis Oktober 2026 memberi kesempatan langka untuk menguji apakah arus nasionalis Singapura berubah menjadi permusuhan terhadap Indonesia. Kronologinya ringkas. The Independent Singapore dalam laporan Singaporeans urge PM Wong to do more after he announces probe into companies behind haze (16 Oktober 2026) mencatat unggahan Wong pada 15 Oktober bahwa pemerintah sedang menelusuri perusahaan yang mungkin bertanggung jawab atas kebakaran dan dapat bertindak berdasarkan undang-undang asap. Pada 21 dan 22 Oktober, Bahlil berbicara tentang “mode bertahan hidup” dan negara yang tidak menghormati Indonesia. Mothership dalam laporan Indonesia to cut gas exports to Singapore (24 Oktober 2026) mencatat pemangkasan 31 BBTUD mulai 24 Oktober, terdiri atas 15 BBTUD dari Natuna dan 16 BBTUD dari Sumatra, dan mengingatkan bahwa pengurangan bertahap sudah disepakati sejak perpanjangan kontrak 2022 hingga 2028. MustShareNews dalam laporan Indonesia cuts natural gas exports to S’pore by 9% (24 Oktober 2026) mengutip Otoritas Pasar Energi bahwa pengurangan itu kurang dari 2 persen kebutuhan gas harian Singapura yang melampaui 1.000 BBTUD.

Bagaimana reaksi warganet Singapura? Bukti terbuka yang tersedia menunjukkan bahwa kemarahan terutama diarahkan ke pemerintah sendiri dan ke korporasi, bukan ke bangsa Indonesia. Laporan The Independent Singapore yang sama, berbasis tangkapan layar Reddit, mencatat komentar yang menuntut tindakan tegas dari pemerintah, misalnya “Singaporeans deserve decisive action, not just statements and tokens of concern”, serta desakan agar bisnis yang mengambil untung dari kebakaran dihentikan; laporan itu tidak memuat komentar yang menyerang Indonesia sebagai bangsa. JawaPos dalam laporan Gara-gara Kabut Asap Indonesia, PM Singapura Disindir Warganya Sendiri (14 Oktober 2026), mengutip The Online Citizen, mencatat sindiran warganet terhadap Wong, termasuk satu komentar yang menuding Indonesia menggunakan asap untuk menekan Singapura. Temuan ini konsisten dengan penilaian kajian Perang Narasi bahwa opini daring Singapura bersifat organik dan dengan gambaran esai Ekosistem Blog Singapura tentang satire dan kritik diri. Esai di KBA13 Insight berjudul Relasi Indonesia–Singapura: Interdependensi Ekonomi, Politik Keamanan, dan Dinamika Strategis ASEAN telah menunjukkan bahwa hubungan kedua negara selalu diwarnai ketegangan sekaligus ketergantungan, dan bahwa isu asap telah berubah menjadi persoalan keamanan nontradisional.

Sejarah memberi preseden tentang bagaimana negara Singapura dapat merujuk “opini publik” dalam sengketa dengan Jakarta. The Jakarta Post dalam laporan RI-Singapore row worsens (10 Februari 2014) mencatat bahwa dalam sengketa penamaan KRI Usman-Harun, Singapura membatalkan pertemuan kerja sama pertahanan dengan alasan opini publik dan Menteri Tan Chuan-Jin menyatakan tidak ada yang heroik dari membunuh warga sipil tak bersalah. Arah sebaliknya juga terjadi: The Jakarta Post dalam laporan Singapore dismisses claims of taking advantage of Indonesia’s weakening economy (24 Juli 2026) mencatat kampanye tandingan “Sell Singapore” di media sosial Indonesia dan jawaban Menteri Negara Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim bahwa serangan daring tidak mencerminkan sentimen sebenarnya dalam hubungan bilateral. Penilaian bagian ini: nasionalisme Singapura terhadap Indonesia pada Oktober 2026 bersifat defensif-legalistik dan disalurkan negara, bukan nativis-agresif (keyakinan Sedang, karena tidak ada data lintas platform yang sistematis). Risiko yang perlu dipantau adalah perpindahan kemarahan dari korporasi ke pekerja migran Indonesia, mengingat audit Ferrara menunjukkan pekerja migran sudah menjadi sasaran kebencian berbingkai ekonomi; hingga 28 Oktober 2026 tidak ditemukan bukti terbuka tentang perpindahan itu (keyakinan Rendah atas risiko, Sedang atas ketiadaan bukti). Bagi Jakarta, pelajaran terpentingnya adalah bahwa retorika “rasa hormat” dan “mode bertahan hidup” cenderung memperkuat narasi kerentanan Singapura dan merapatkan warga di belakang PAP, bukan melemahkannya.

Argumen Tandingan, Skenario hingga 2030, dan Rekomendasi

Setidaknya empat argumen tandingan perlu ditimbang. Pertama, sebagian pengamat akan berkata bahwa negara Singapura itu sendirilah yang ultra-nasionalis dan ultra-konservatif. Argumen ini mengandung kebenaran parsial: negara memang komunitarian, konservatif dalam soal keluarga, dan sangat sigap mensekuritisasi identitas. Namun label “ultra” menyesatkan karena negara yang sama mencabut Pasal 377A, mempertahankan multirasialisme konstitusional, dan menindak xenofobia secara terbuka; istilah yang lebih tepat adalah konservatisme negara yang pragmatis. Kedua, ada yang berpendapat bahwa angka elektoral yang kecil menyembunyikan arus keras yang tertekan dan bisa meledak. Argumen ini sah sebagai peringatan, sebab survei dapat dipengaruhi kecenderungan menyembunyikan pandangan tidak populer, dan amplifikasi kebencian anti-CECA menunjukkan energi yang belum tersalurkan; namun tidak ada bukti terbuka tentang organisasi bawah tanah yang menunggu momentum. Ketiga, kasus sayap kanan jauh dapat dibaca sebagai awal gerakan. Data ISD justru menunjukkan pola individu yang saling terhubung secara longgar di dunia maya, seperti kontak antara remaja 17 tahun dan Nick Lee, bukan struktur gerakan; meski demikian, kontak semacam itu adalah indikator dini yang harus dipantau. Keempat, sebagian data survei dikumpulkan secara daring dan sebagian data media berbahasa Inggris, sehingga pandangan komunitas berbahasa Mandarin, Melayu, dan Tamil mungkin kurang terwakili; audit Ferrara yang lintas bahasa sebagian menutup celah ini.

Skenario pertama paling mungkin karena seluruh mekanisme penyerapan masih bekerja dan PAP baru memperbarui mandatnya. Skenario kedua menjadi lebih mungkin bila biaya hidup tetap menjadi isu utama dan oposisi menengah tergoda memakai bahasa anti-pendatang untuk menembus pemilih muda. Skenario ketiga dapat dipicu oleh gugatan baru tentang hak keluarga atau kurikulum, sedangkan skenario keempat sangat bergantung pada perilaku Jakarta dan Kuala Lumpur. Skenario kelima berprobabilitas rendah berkat kapasitas deteksi dini ISD dan laporan dari teman sebaya, tetapi dampaknya terhadap harmoni komunal akan sangat besar. Atas dasar itu, rekomendasi disusun bagi aktor bernama. Kepada Kementerian Dalam Negeri Singapura dan otoritas digitalnya: perluas pendekatan rehabilitasi dan pelaporan sebaya ke ekosistem permainan daring seperti Roblox yang kini muncul dalam rilis ISD, dan terbitkan data agregat tentang penggunaan perintah pembatasan berdasarkan undang-undang harmoni rasial agar sekuritisasi tetap dapat diawasi publik. Kepada WP, PSP, dan partai oposisi lain: tetapkan kode etik internal yang memisahkan kritik kebijakan tenaga kerja dari bahasa rasial, sebagaimana diusulkan Pritam Singh pada 2021 melalui keterbukaan data. Kepada IPS dan perguruan tinggi Singapura: perluas audit sentimen ke HardwareZone dan TikTok, serta pisahkan secara tegas istilah konservatisme politik dan konservatisme moral dalam publikasi survei.

Kepada Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia dan KBRI Singapura: bedakan secara eksplisit dalam komunikasi publik antara kebijakan pemerintah Singapura, korporasi yang terkait kebakaran, dan warga Singapura, karena data menunjukkan warga Singapura lebih banyak mengkritik pemerintahnya sendiri; perkuat pula perlindungan konsuler bagi pekerja migran Indonesia sebagai langkah pencegahan bila kemarahan daring bergeser sasaran. Kepada pejabat dan pemengaruh Indonesia: hindari bahasa yang dapat dibaca sebagai ancaman eksistensial, seperti klaim tentang oksigen atau “negara yang menghina”, karena bahasa itu menyediakan bahan sekuritisasi bagi narasi kerentanan Singapura. Esai di KBA13 Insight berjudul Islamophobia in Indonesia’s Cyberspace: Politics, Buzzers, and Virtual Fear menggambarkan buzzer sebagai milisi siber yang hidup dari penjualan narasi ketakutan, dan esai Pasca 25 Agustus 2025: Operasi Wacana, Influencer, dan Perang Informasi di Medsos mencatat betapa sulitnya menetapkan satu dalang dalam gelombang informasi; kedua pelajaran itu berlaku pula bagi perang wacana lintas selat. Kepada ASEAN dan mekanisme kawasan tentang polusi asap lintas batas: alihkan sengketa asap ke mekanisme teknis yang kredibel agar isu lingkungan tidak terus menjadi bahan bakar nasionalisme di kedua sisi selat.

Keterbatasan dan Kesimpulan

Telaah ini memiliki sejumlah keterbatasan yang perlu dinyatakan terang. Data tentang forum HardwareZone dan TikTok tidak tersedia secara sistematis dalam sumber terbuka, sehingga penilaian tentang ruang daring bertumpu pada audit Ferrara yang mencakup Facebook, Reddit, dan YouTube, dengan peringatan penulisnya sendiri bahwa kesepakatan antar-model pada sampel sulit hanya sekitar κ 0,42. Laporan Penilaian Ancaman Terorisme 2026 dibaca melalui liputan media, bukan dokumen asli. Kluster “Conservative” dalam survei IPS mengukur preferensi politik, bukan moralitas, dan telaah ini tidak memiliki survei khusus tentang sikap warga Singapura terhadap Indonesia. Sebagian besar sumber berbahasa Inggris, sehingga suara komunitas berbahasa Mandarin, Melayu, dan Tamil mungkin kurang terwakili. Akhirnya, perkembangan krisis Oktober 2026 masih bergerak, sehingga penilaian di Bagian XIII perlu ditinjau ulang setiap kali ada pemicu baru, terutama keputusan MSCI pada 2027 dan berakhirnya kontrak gas pada 2028. Klaim yang tidak dapat diverifikasi, termasuk jumlah peserta Pink Dot setelah 2014 dan ukuran komunitas daring sayap kanan di Singapura, sengaja tidak dicantumkan.

Dengan segala keterbatasan itu, kesimpulan pokok telaah ini cukup kokoh. Singapura memiliki arus keras, tetapi bukan dalam bentuk yang dibayangkan pertanyaan awal. Nativisme ekonomi nyata dan teramplifikasi secara daring, terutama terhadap pendatang India yang dikaitkan dengan CECA, pendatang dari RRT, dan pekerja migran; namun ia tidak memiliki partai yang kuat. Konservatisme moral-religius luas dan terlembaga, tetapi memilih jalur hukum dan memperoleh hasil konstitusional, sehingga tidak tepat disebut ultra. Ekstremisme sayap kanan jauh benar-benar ekstrem secara ideologis, tetapi hadir sebagai radikalisasi diri remaja yang terisolasi dan makin muda, dengan sasaran utama Muslim dan Melayu. Faktor Tiongkok bergerak dua arah: kritik tentang bias Tionghoa dalam proyek kebangsaan, pengawasan negara terhadap pengaruh RRT, dan nativisme lokal terhadap pendatang RRT. Arus liberal-progresif tumbuh, tetapi dibatasi regulasi. Di atas semua itu berdiri negara komunitarian yang menduduki ruang ideologis kanan, mengubah isu identitas menjadi isu keamanan, dan menjadikan dirinya wasit atas semua arus.

Bagi hubungan dengan Indonesia, implikasinya bersifat ganda. Di satu sisi, tidak ada arus ultra-nasionalis Singapura yang terorganisasi dan siap mendorong pemerintahnya ke arah konfrontasi; reaksi warganet pada Oktober 2026 lebih banyak menuntut ketegasan pemerintah sendiri dan akuntabilitas korporasi. Di sisi lain, narasi kerentanan yang menjadi jantung ideologi negara akan semakin kuat setiap kali Jakarta berbicara dengan bahasa ancaman, dan dalam suasana itu legalisme Singapura akan mengeras, bukan melunak. Esai di KBA13 Insight berjudul Singapura di Selat Melaka: Konsentrasi Fungsi, Asimetri Kekuasaan, dan Risiko Eskalasi Kawasan (2026) mengingatkan bahwa konsentrasi fungsi menghasilkan efisiensi pada masa normal tetapi menjadi titik kegagalan tunggal pada masa krisis; logika yang sama berlaku bagi ideologi negara-kota itu. Langit Singapura yang teratur bukanlah langit tanpa awan, melainkan langit yang awannya terus diukur, dipetakan, dan dikendalikan. Memahami cara kerja pengendalian itu jauh lebih berguna bagi diplomasi Indonesia daripada membayangkan sebuah kubu ultra yang, menurut bukti yang tersedia, tidak pernah benar-benar terbentuk.

An Ordered Sky and the Question of the “Ultra”

In mid-October 2026, Singapore’s sky turned white with smoke from forest and land fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan, the Jakarta stock exchange was shaken by MSCI’s planned reclassification, and on 24 October SKK Migas began cutting pipeline gas supplies to Singapore. In such a climate, the Indonesian public can easily imagine Singapore as a single, uniform political body: rational, cold and, to some, excessively nationalist. In 2026, an essay in KBA13 Insight entitled Masa Depan Konfrontasi menuju Perang Terbuka Antara Singapura dan Indonesia [The Future of Confrontation towards Open War between Singapore and Indonesia] (25 October 2026), which is also catalogued as a document in the KBA13 Academy Archive and Library, wove these three triggers, namely smoke, shares and gas, into the historical memory of the 1963–1966 Confrontation and offered scenarios for 2027–2030. The question born of that situation sounds simple but is in fact complex: why are there ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative currents in Singapore, and how much influence do they have on the way the city-state treats its neighbours? The question carries the presupposition that “ultra” currents do exist and are strong enough to count. This brief does not simply accept that presupposition; instead, it tests it by mapping the whole of Singapore’s political currents, from the ruling party to the violent fringe, and by weighing every label against the evidence.

This brief has been deliberately placed alongside three Research Center studies published the day before, and it does not repeat their angles. The study Perang Narasi di Seberang Selat [The Narrative War across the Strait] (27 October 2026) concluded that Singaporean netizens’ opinion of the October crisis was organic and found no evidence of a Singaporean state influence operation; that study also dissected the legal architecture of POFMA and FICA in detail, so this brief merely refers to it. The study Tangga Eskalasi di Selat Singapura [The Escalation Ladder in the Singapore Strait] reads Singapore’s posture as a legalism born of vulnerability and builds an escalation ladder to 2030. The study Damai tetapi Berjarak [Peaceful but Distant] shows that the main dividing line in Singaporean society is now class and citizenship status, no longer race. All three leave a gap that they themselves acknowledge: there is as yet no comprehensive map of ideological currents in Singapore, no reading of online forums such as HardwareZone and Reddit, and no quantitative data on nativist sentiment. This brief fills that gap.

The argument developed below can be summarised at the outset. Singapore does harbour hard currents: an economic nativism hostile to foreign workers and trade agreements, a moral-religious conservatism that rejects changes to sexual and family norms, and a handful of teenagers who self-radicalise through far-right ideology and composite violent ideologies. Yet none of these forms an organised ultra movement. The reason is not repression alone, but the fact that the state built by the People’s Action Party (PAP) already occupies the ideological space that elsewhere is filled by the radical right: the state itself is communitarian-conservative, defensively nationalist, and very quick to turn identity issues into security issues. The fifteen sections that follow set out the framework and method, the PAP’s ideological core, the electoral map and the opposition, four hard currents and one liberal current, the state’s response, the theoretical explanation, the voices of the leaders, the Indonesian mirror of October 2026, counterarguments, scenarios, recommendations and limitations.

Analytical Framework, Method and Levels of Confidence

This brief distinguishes three layers that are often conflated in public debate. The first layer is ideology, that is, a set of ideas about who belongs to the nation, how society ought to be ordered, and which values must be defended. The second layer is rhetoric, that is, the way political actors frame issues, for instance when a debate about foreign labour is given a racial tone. The third layer is organisation, that is, the vehicles that carry ideology and rhetoric into the political arena: parties, civil-society groups, religious networks or online communities. A current deserves to be called “ultra” only if it meets at least two of three conditions: it embraces exclusionary ideas hostile to out-groups across the board, it rejects the pluralist constitutional order or justifies coercion, and it has an organised carrier. On that basis, this brief does not call any named person or group “ultra” unless official or academic sources support it; in most cases the more accurate terms are “nativist”, “conservative” or “populist”, and each of those terms is tied to specific evidence.

The first theoretical lens comes from the work of Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2007), the standard reference for identifying the populist radical right. In 2025, João Ferreira Dias, in a commentary for the European Center for Populism Studies entitled What Is the Ideology That Has Attained Social Hegemony? Let Us Call It Simply Nativism, summarised nativism, drawing on Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, as a worldview that defends the “native” population against external and internal threats, and formulated radical-right populism as a threefold structure: a moral cleavage between a pure people and a corrupt elite, the defence of national identity against multiculturalism, and opposition to the left. The second lens is the securitisation theory of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. CESRAN’s review of Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner, 1998) stresses that securitisation is a speech act that succeeds when an audience accepts an issue as an “existential threat” justifying emergency measures. The third lens comes from Singapore’s own scholarship: the communitarianism of Chua Beng Huat, Kenneth Paul Tan’s critique of meritocracy, Cherian George’s metaphor of the “air-conditioned nation”, Michael Barr’s elite networks, and Garry Rodan’s theory of participation without democracy.

Methodologically, this brief combines analysis of official documents (press releases from the Internal Security Department, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the National Library encyclopaedia), survey data (the IPS Post-Election Survey 2025, the Singapore component of the World Values Survey 2020, the IPS-OnePeople.sg Indicators of Racial and Religious Harmony 2024, and a 2022 Ipsos survey), a computational audit of more than 31 million online posts, quality media coverage, and the archives of kba13.com and pustaka.kba13academy.com. The data cut-off is 28 October 2026. Every judgement is assigned a level of confidence. High confidence is given when a finding rests on several consistent official sources or surveys; Medium when it rests on a single quality source or a reasonable inference from several indicators; Low when it is plausible but the open evidence is thin. One terminological note is needed from the outset: in the IPS post-election survey, the “Conservative” cluster refers to voters inclined to preserve the political status quo and the dominance of the ruling party, not to moral or religious conservatism. Conflating the two would produce mistaken conclusions about the extent of “conservatism” in Singapore.

The PAP’s Ideological Core: Pragmatism, Meritocracy, Multiracialism and the Narrative of Vulnerability

Any map of Singapore’s political currents must begin with the PAP, for the party that has ruled since 1959 is not merely one player among many but the designer of the playing field. Its ideological core is most clearly legible in the Shared Values document. The National Library of Singapore’s encyclopaedia, Infopedia, in its entry on Shared Values, records that Goh Chok Tong first proposed a set of official values on 28 October 1988, that President Wee Kim Wee repeated the call on 9 January 1989, that the White Paper on Shared Values was presented to parliament on 2 January 1991, and that parliament adopted it on 15 January 1991. The five values are nation before community and society above self, the family as the basic unit of society, community support and respect for the individual, consensus not conflict, and racial and religious harmony. The backdrop was elite anxiety that citizens were drifting towards an outlook on life that was, in Wee’s words, “more Westernised, individualistic, and self-centred”. The document matters for this brief because it shows that family conservatism and suspicion of Western individualism belong not to fringe groups but to state doctrine.

In 2017, Chua Beng Huat, in his book Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore (NUS Press), showed that the PAP built a non-Western communitarian ideology as an alternative to liberalism and tested it in public housing, multiracialism and state capitalism; he also noted a “liberalisation of the cultural sphere” without the collapse of the party’s hegemony. In 2008, Kenneth Paul Tan, in the International Political Science Review article Meritocracy and Elitism in a Global City: Ideological Shifts in Singapore, argued that meritocracy is an unstable ideology because its egalitarian ideal collides with competition and reward, so that in practice it justifies elitism and technocratic government, and he anticipated that income inequality and global crises would erode it. Michael Barr, in The Ruling Elite of Singapore (I.B. Tauris, 2014), traced the networks of power built around Lee Kuan Yew, while Barr and Zlatko Skrbis, in Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-building Project (NIAS Press, 2009), argued that the elite-led nation-building project allowed “a Singaporean version of Chinese ethno-nationalism” to dominate the debate on national identity.

The third element is the narrative of vulnerability, that is, the belief that a small state without natural resources can survive only through discipline, unity and vigilance. Singapore’s Ministry of Defence, in its fact sheet on the evolution of Total Defence (15 February 2019), records that the concept was introduced in 1984 with reference to the Swedish and Swiss models, made Psychological Defence its core, and in 2019 added Digital Defence as a sixth pillar. Kenneth Paul Tan, in Singapore: Identity, Brand, Power (Cambridge University Press, 2018), describes a state that leads the creation of a national narrative for self-defence and relies on smart power because its resources are limited. The line of leadership from Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong to Lawrence Wong, sworn in on 15 May 2024, has not altered this core. Cherian George, in Singapore: The Air-Conditioned Nation (Landmark Books, 2000; revised edition 2020), calls it the politics of comfort and control, while Garry Rodan, in Participation without Democracy (Cornell University Press, 2018), shows that consultative channels of participation have done more to dampen contestation than to widen it. The consequence for this brief is decisive: the PAP itself is the principal carrier of a conservative-communitarian state nationalism, so any other right-wing current must compete with the state on the same ideological ground.

The Electoral Map and the Ideological Spectrum of the Opposition

The last two elections offer a picture of the boundaries of the political spectrum. An Al Jazeera report entitled Singapore’s governing PAP returns to power but faces setback (11 July 2020) noted that in the election of 10 July 2020 the PAP won 83 of 93 seats with about 61 per cent of the vote, down from 70 per cent in 2015, while the Workers’ Party (WP) won 10 seats, the most ever won by the opposition; Lee Hsien Loong called it “not as strong a mandate as I hoped for but it’s a good mandate”. For the election of 3 May 2025, a Mothership/MustShareNews report entitled GE2025: PAP forms Govt with landslide 65.57% of votes (4 May 2025) recorded that the PAP took 65.57 per cent of the vote and 87 of 97 seats. A report by The Edge Singapore entitled PAP wins 87 of 97 seats, clinches 65.57% vote share added that the WP retained 10 seats, the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) lost its two Non-Constituency Member of Parliament seats, and voter turnout of 92.47 per cent was a new low. The IPS post-election survey, POPS(12) IPS Post-Election Survey 2025 (2,056 respondents), found that 74 per cent of respondents rated the cost of living as very important, 74 per cent considered it important to have elected opposition members, the PAP’s credibility fell 17 points to 69 per cent, and the WP’s credibility fell 14 points to 65 per cent. The “Conservative” cluster rose from 19 to 25 per cent and the “Pluralist” cluster from 22 to 27 per cent, while “Swing” voters shrank from 59 to 48 per cent; the rise of the pro-status-quo cluster occurred chiefly among those aged 21–39.

The opposition spectrum is narrow and largely centrist. The WP positions itself as a check on the government with an agenda of a minimum wage, affordable healthcare and oversight of public spending, as summarised in The Money Bees’ 2026 guide to Singapore’s political parties, which also records national vote shares of 14.99 per cent for the WP, 4.88 per cent for the PSP, 3.96 per cent for Red Dot United (RDU), 3.72 per cent for the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), 2.51 per cent for the People’s Alliance for Reform (PAR) and 1.18 per cent for the Singapore People’s Party (SPP). The PSP is described as a party leaning towards the centre with a focus on the cost of living, jobs for locals and CPF policy. The SDP campaigns on housing affordability and freedom of expression; Ng Reuben’s analysis in Global-is-Asian entitled Why did some opposition parties see stinging losses at GE2025? (May 2025) notes that Chee Soon Juan won almost 47 per cent in Sembawang West and mentions the SDP’s single-payer healthcare agenda. An encyclopaedic summary of Red Dot United describes the party, founded on 26 May 2020 by Ravi Philemon and Michelle Lee, as progressive centre-left social democratic.

At the other end of the spectrum are small parties that use populist language. An encyclopaedic summary of Peoples Voice records that the party led by Lim Tean was registered in October 2018, is categorised as populist, won 2.37 per cent of the national vote in 2020, and since June 2023 has been part of the PAR alliance. Earlier, the Malay Mail, in the report Singapore opposition party SingFirst dissolved (25 June 2020), recorded that the party named Singaporeans First, founded by Tan Jee Say in August 2014, was dissolved ahead of the 2020 election after losing in two GRCs in 2015. The party’s very name encapsulated a slogan of economic nationalism popular since 2011, but its electoral career was short. The 2022 vote on the repeal of Section 377A showed that the moral cleavage cuts across parties rather than separating them: two WP members opposed the repeal, two other WP members abstained on the constitutional amendment, and two PSP members opposed that amendment. The assessment of this section is that no party with a significant vote share in Singapore carries an ultra-nationalist or ultra-conservative programme; nativist rhetoric does surface in fringe parties and, on particular issues, in mid-sized parties, but its electoral pull is small (High confidence).

Nativism and Economic Nationalism: from Hong Lim to CECA

The current closest to the radical right in Singapore is economic nativism, that is, the belief that locals are disadvantaged by inflows of newcomers and by trade agreements. In 2015, J. Lim, in the Japanese Journal of Political Science article Popular nationalism in the wake of the 2011 national elections in Singapore, distinguished the state nationalism promoted by the PAP, centred on economic growth and the party’s triumphs over colonialism, racial violence and communism, from a popular nationalism that grows from below and feels national identity to be threatened by liberal immigration policies, especially by newcomers labelled by the government as foreign talent. The public peak of this current came two years later. An Al Jazeera report entitled Singaporeans protest over population plan (16 February 2013) recorded that at least 4,000 people gathered in Hong Lim Park to oppose the Population White Paper, which projected that the population could grow from 5.3 million to 6.9 million by 2030, mainly through foreign workers. The organiser, Gilbert Goh, asked the government to review the policy, and financial planner Leong Sze Hian said that the state could not bring in foreigners to compete with its own people while doing very little to look after those people.

At the end of the same year, the Little India riot tested whether newcomer-local tensions would turn into communal violence. The Malay Mail, in the report Little India riot was sparked off by accident, inquiry panel says (1 July 2014), recorded that around 400 rioters were involved on 8 December 2013 after an Indian national was killed by a bus. The committee of inquiry rejected the reading that the riot arose from foreign workers’ dissatisfaction with their working conditions and stressed that attempts to frame it as a racial issue were wholly unfounded, while naming alcohol as a major contributing factor. This response is characteristic: the state framed the event as a matter of public order, not of structural grievance, thereby narrowing the space for nativist mobilisation around it. The next wave centred on CECA, the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with India. Mothership, in the report Ong Ye Kung agrees with Pritam Singh that early information on nativist issues could help quell falsehoods early (6 July 2021), recorded Minister Ong Ye Kung insisting that “CECA Chapter 9 does not allow an unfettered inflow of Indian nationals” and asking the PSP to withdraw its allegations, while the WP’s Pritam Singh spoke of the need for data transparency to dampen conversations drifting towards xenophobia or nativism. Mothership again recorded, in the report PSP’s anti-CECA campaign has ‘strongly racist & xenophobic undertones’: Lawrence Wong (14 September 2021), that Lawrence Wong judged the PSP motion to be racist and xenophobic in tone and asked the party to stop exploiting citizens’ anxieties; the PSP itself rejected the charge; MustShareNews, in the report PSP Refutes Ong Ye Kung’s Claims That They Contributed To Racist Sentiments, Demands Apology (2 July 2021), quoted PSP Secretary-General Francis Yuen as saying that the debate concerned professionals, managers, executives and technicians, not racial tension.

In May 2021, the debate brushed against real violence. The Malay Mail, in the report Singapore PM Lee and several ministers speak out against alleged racist attack (11 May 2021), recorded an attack on a woman of Indian descent that was condemned by Lee Hsien Loong and several ministers. In 2022, sociologist Laavanya Kathiravelu, in an essay for Academia.sg entitled Doubly minoritised: Indianness in Singapore and xenophobia as racism, argued that skin colour becomes a marker of the “outsider” when the boundary between citizens and newcomers blurs, and that anger over CECA was also directed at a government perceived as favouring particular groups. The size of this current online can now be estimated. Emilio Ferrara, in a computational audit entitled Cultural Targets, Structural Frames, Binding Morals: A Cross-Lingual Audit of Online Hate in Multicultural Singapore, analysed 31,032,005 items from 231 Facebook pages, 23 subreddits and 16 Singapore-oriented YouTube channels in 2025. Of the 3,323 comments confirmed as hate speech, 31 per cent carried an explicit anti-immigration stance; that stance was present in 98–99 per cent of hate directed at CECA and migrant-worker targets, and anti-CECA hate received the highest amplification. The assessment of this section: economic nativism is a real current with an exclusionary ideology and amplified rhetoric (High confidence), but its organisational carriers are weak and its size is relatively small compared with the overall volume of online discourse (Medium confidence, given that Ferrara himself cautions that relative patterns are more reliable than absolute prevalence figures).

Religious and Moral Conservatism: Section 377A and After

The second current often called “ultra-conservative” is moral-religious conservatism. Its social base is broad. Straits Times coverage archived by the IPS, entitled Singapore still conservative on moral, sexuality issues but more liberal since 2002 (3 February 2021), based on the World Values Survey 2020 with more than 2,000 respondents, recorded that 59.3 per cent of respondents judged homosexuality to be “never or rarely justifiable”, with a figure of 75.2 per cent among Muslims, while the importance of religion declined from about 76 per cent in 2002 and 2012 to 65.3 per cent. The Malay Mail, in the report Left or right? IPS survey finds almost half of Singaporeans undecided (3 February 2021), added that 30.6 per cent of respondents placed themselves on the left and 20.8 per cent on the right, with 42.7 per cent of those aged 21–35 on the left and 31.8 per cent of those over 65 on the right. The direction of change is also visible in an Ipsos survey entitled Attitudes towards same-sex relationships shift towards greater inclusivity in Singapore (21 June 2022): support for retaining Section 377A fell from 55 per cent in 2018 to 44 per cent in 2022, while opposition rose from 12 to 20 per cent.

The state navigated this change with a compromise that was itself conservative. The Malay Mail, in the report Singapore will decriminalise sex between men, says PM Lee (21 August 2022), quoted Lee Hsien Loong at the National Day Rally as saying that repeal was the right step, accompanied by a promise to protect the definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman from constitutional challenge. The Malay Mail, in the report Singapore Parliament repeals Section 377A, approves constitutional change (30 November 2022), recorded that on 29 November 2022 the repeal passed with 93 votes in favour and 3 against, while the new Article 156 of the constitution passed with 85 votes in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions. The reactions of religious bodies varied. Mothership, in the report Disappointment, acceptance, relief: 34 religious, social, & LGBTQ+ groups’ responses to 377A repeal (22 August 2022), recorded that the National Council of Churches accepted the repeal while deeming it unnecessary, the Catholic Archdiocese affirmed that it did not seek to criminalise LGBTQ people, the Alliance of Pentecostal and Charismatic Churches, representing more than 80 churches, called it “an extremely regrettable decision”, and MUIS affirmed the Islamic view of marriage while declaring that everyone, whatever their sexual orientation, should feel safe.

Beyond the official bodies, moral conservatism is mobilised by civic groups. On 30 July 2022, the Ministry of Home Affairs, in its reply to media queries about the Protect Singapore Townhall, stated that the Protect Singapore group had not broken the law and that the government would step in if there was incitement or attack from any quarter. Two years later, the Malay Mail, in the report In Singapore, politicians show up for Pink Dot despite scorecard grading their ‘family values’ (29 June 2024), recorded that the group had issued a scorecard grading members of parliament on their positions on LGBTQ issues. The roots of this mobilisation are older: Global Voices, in the report Singapore’s ‘Pink Dot’ LGBT Rights Rally Was Bigger Than Ever, Despite #WearWhite Opponents (4 July 2014), recorded that the Islamic educator Noor Deros initiated the Wear White campaign and that pastor Lawrence Khong held a family worship service attended by about 6,400 people. Noor Deros’s name resurfaced in the 2025 election. The South China Morning Post, in the report Singapore doubles down on zero tolerance for identity politics, foreign interference (14 October 2025), recorded that he, together with members of Malaysia’s PAS, backed WP candidate Faisal Manap in Tampines, and the Ministry of Home Affairs, in its response to the PAS statement of 15 October 2025, called it “a serious interference in Singapore’s elections”. The assessment of this section: moral-religious conservatism is the socially largest and most institutionalised current, but it works through petitions, forums and legal lobbying; the label “ultra” does not fit these institutions, while the transnational dimension in the 2025 election is better read as an attempt to mobilise votes on religious grounds that was rejected by the state and also by the WP (High confidence).

The Violent Fringe: Far-Right Self-Radicalisation among Teenagers

If any current deserves to be called extreme in ideological terms, it is found on the violent fringe, not in parties or churches. On 27 January 2021, the Internal Security Department, in the release Detention of Singaporean youth who intended to attack Muslims on the anniversary of Christchurch attacks in New Zealand, announced the detention of a 16-year-old Protestant Christian student of Indian descent who planned to attack Assyafaah Mosque and Yusof Ishak Mosque with a machete on 15 March 2021, the anniversary of the Christchurch attacks. The ISD described him as the first detainee inspired by far-right extremist ideology, driven by a strong antipathy towards Islam and a fascination with violence. On 10 February 2025, the Malay Mail, in the report Singapore locks up self-radicalised ‘East Asian supremacist’, recorded the detention of Nick Lee Xing Qiu, aged 18, who idolised the Christchurch attacker, collected neo-Nazi symbols, subscribed to the Great Replacement theory, and hoped to spark a “race war” in Singapore.

The pattern continued. The ISD, in the release Issuance of Orders under the ISA against two self-radicalised Singaporean youths (2 April 2025), announced the detention of a 17-year-old who identified as an “East Asian Supremacist”, hated Malays and Muslims, planned to attack mosques with firearms while livestreaming the attack, and was an online contact of Nick Lee. The Malay Mail, in the report In first case, Singapore detains teen who idolised Hitler, bin Laden and Kim Jong-il (9 September 2025), recorded the case of a 14-year-old with a mixture of jihadist and far-right ideology and admiration for the North Korean regime, who was placed under a restriction order. The ISD, in the release Issuance of Orders of Detention under the ISA against three self-radicalised Singaporean youths (27 July 2026), then announced that a 14-year-old student, the youngest ISA detainee in history, subscribed to what is called Composite Violent Extremism: support for ISIS mixed with antisemitic and neo-Nazi views, Atomwaffen Division accelerationism, and white supremacy. He drafted a 21-page manifesto and planned a mass stabbing at his school, influenced among other things by shooting games on Roblox that recreate school shootings.

Aggregate data put these cases in proportion. The ISD, in the Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2025 (29 July 2025), recorded that 17 youths aged 20 and under had been dealt with under the ISA since 2015, twelve of them in the last five years, and that nine intended to carry out attacks at home. The July 2026 release states that more than half of the 23 youths dealt with over roughly a decade intended to attack Singapore, and the Malay Mail, in the report Singapore terror threat remains high as Middle East conflicts fuel radicalisation (10 September 2026), quoted the 2026 threat report as stating that cases of youth radicalisation rose from four (2017–2021) to fifteen (since 2022), with the Israel–Palestine conflict and the US–Israel war with Iran heightening intercommunal tensions. The majority of youth cases remain linked to ISIS; far-right cases are a minority that matters because their targets are almost always Muslims and Malays, their perpetrators come from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, and their inspiration is imported from the global online ecosystem. The assessment of this section: far-right extremism in Singapore is ideologically real and “ultra” in the full sense, but it appears as individual self-radicalisation with no local organisation documented in open sources (High confidence), with a trend towards ever younger ages (High confidence).

The China Factor, Fears of Sinicisation, and Chinese Ethno-nationalism

The fourth current is harder to map because it moves in two directions at once. On one side is the academic critique that Singapore’s official nationalism leans towards a Chinese identity. Barr and Skrbis, as mentioned above, speak of a Singaporean version of Chinese ethno-nationalism dominating the identity debate. Survey data suggest that minority experiences do differ. CNA coverage archived by the IPS, entitled Trust between racial groups in Singapore grows but stereotyping rises (3 February 2025), based on an IPS-OnePeople.sg survey of 4,000 residents in April–August 2024, recorded that 18.4 per cent of Malay respondents and 16.7 per cent of Indian respondents reported discrimination when applying for jobs or promotions, compared with 3.7 per cent of Chinese respondents; 43.5 per cent admitted making assumptions based on race, up from 35.2 per cent in 2018; yet 65.4 per cent rated racial and religious harmony as high or very high, and intergroup distrust fell from 42.7 per cent in 2013 to 27.2 per cent.

On the other side is the state’s anxiety about the influence of the People’s Republic of China, which is handled through security instruments. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in the release Cancellation of Singapore Permanent Residence Status: Huang Jing and Yang Xiuping (August 2017), described the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy academic as an “agent of influence of a foreign country” who had sought to influence Singapore’s foreign policy, without naming the country concerned. The same ministry, in the notice Intended Designation of Chan Man Ping Philip as Politically Significant Person under FICA (2 February 2024), judged that the naturalised businessman had shown “susceptibility to be influenced by foreign actors”, and formally designated him on 26 February 2024. The racial harmony law in force since September 2026 also requires some 300 race-based clan and business associations to report foreign donations and affiliations from April 2028.

Online, sentiment against newcomers from mainland China is in fact voiced largely by citizens of Chinese descent themselves. Ferrara’s audit records that Mandarin-language discourse centres on the axis of Chinese Singaporeans versus PRC nationals, that anti-PRC narratives are present in 15 per cent of English-language hate and 16 per cent of Mandarin-language hate, and that 59 per cent of hate against PRC targets carries an anti-immigration stance. The “China factor” in Singapore therefore cannot be read as a single, uniform chauvinist current. There is an academic critique of Chinese bias in the nation-building project, there is state surveillance of PRC influence channels, and there is a local nativism that targets PRC newcomers. For Indonesian readers, this finding is relevant because discourse that imagines Singapore as a uniform “Chinese state”, as the Escalation Ladder study warned, overlooks these internal cleavages. In 2026, the book The Beijing Factor in Southeast Asia, catalogued in the KBA13 Academy Archive and Library, likewise stressed that the presence of Chinese power does not automatically mean control over, or political compliance by, the states of the region. The assessment of this section: there is no organised Chinese chauvinist movement (Medium confidence), while anxiety about PRC influence is managed primarily as a matter of state security (High confidence).

The Liberal-Progressive Current and the Ecology of Online Space

A map that contained only the hard currents would mislead, for the liberal-progressive current is also growing and is the direct adversary of moral conservatism. Global Voices, in the same report on Pink Dot 2014, recorded that more than 26,000 people gathered in Hong Lim Park on 28 June 2014, the largest turnout since the first event in 2009, precisely in the year of the Wear White campaign. A decade later, several members of parliament from the PAP, WP, PSP and RDU attended Pink Dot 2024 despite the Protect Singapore scorecard; the Malay Mail quoted PAP MP Eric Chua as saying that serving Singaporeans today means serving a society that is “very pluralistic”, and PAP MP Darryl David questioned the purpose of ranking members of parliament by their positions. The “Pluralist” cluster in the 2025 IPS survey and the tendency of young people to place themselves on the left in the World Values Survey 2020 show this current’s social base, although political pluralism and moral liberalism do not always overlap.

The liberal current’s room for manoeuvre is also constrained by the state, and the constraint applies symmetrically to everyone deemed to open the door to foreign influence. Global Voices, in the report Singapore’s The Online Citizen news website stops operating after government suspends its license (18 September 2021), recorded that the IMDA suspended the critical portal’s licence because it was deemed to have failed to disclose its funders, on the grounds that political websites must not be “coming under the influence of foreign entities or funding”. The Huang Jing case of 2017 showed that even academia is not beyond the reach of security logic. Cherian George has since 2000 described this pattern as a trade-off between comfort and control, and the revised edition of his book in 2020 signals that the metaphor remained relevant two decades later.

The online ecology is the arena in which all the currents meet. Ferrara’s audit shows that English-language discourse is broad and dominated by Muslim, PRC and LGBTQ targets, that Malay-language discourse centres on religion and LGBTQ issues, and that hate is driven almost entirely by disgust (94–96 per cent). It is important to note that the corpus does not include HardwareZone, the local online forum popular among Singaporean netizens, and that there are no open systematic data on TikTok; both gaps must be read as limits of knowledge, not as evidence of absence. In 2025, an essay in KBA13 Insight entitled Ekosistem Blog Singapura: Gaya Hidup, Politik, dan Proyeksi Nasionalisme 2050 [Singapore’s Blog Ecosystem: Lifestyle, Politics and the Projection of Nationalism to 2050] described an ecosystem in which banal nationalism, satire and criticism of the government itself coexist, and showed that Singaporean national identity remains strong because it is nurtured through everyday nationalism. That picture is consistent with the online reactions of October 2026 described in Section XIII. The assessment of this section: the liberal-progressive current is growing socially and has begun to receive symbolic recognition from politicians across parties (Medium confidence), but its alternative media are vulnerable to foreign-influence regulation (High confidence).

The Architecture of the State’s Response and the Logic of Securitisation

The state’s response to all the currents above follows a single grammar: identity issues are treated as security issues before they have a chance to become political issues. The architecture of POFMA and FICA has been set out in the Narrative War study, so here it suffices to note the two instruments most directly relevant to the nativist and religious currents. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in the release Commencement of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony (Amendment) Act 2019, explains that from 1 November 2022 restraining orders take immediate effect and extend to online communications, religious groups must be led by citizens or permanent residents, single foreign donations of S$10,000 or more must be declared, and offenders may undertake a Community Remedial Initiative. Mothership, in the report New law to safeguard racial harmony (September 2026), recorded that the Maintenance of Racial Harmony Act, passed on 4 February 2025, came into force on 15 September 2026, established the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony under former Supreme Court judge Choo Han Teck, gave the minister powers to issue restraining orders against content harmful to racial harmony, and replaced Sections 298 and 298A of the Penal Code. In the 2025 election, the government also ordered the blocking of posts by foreigners deemed to be trying to influence voters on religious grounds.

Read through the lens of securitisation, this pattern has two faces. The first face is prevention: by declaring that the politics of race and religion are an existential threat to a small multiracial state, the state prevents nativist and religious currents from turning into political organisations that carry identity. Audience acceptance, the condition for successful securitisation according to Buzan and his colleagues, appears fairly high; the 2025 IPS survey recorded that 84 per cent of voters felt free to vote as they wished, and most citizens rate racial and religious harmony as high. The second face is narrowing: the same apparatus constrains alternative media and civic activism, so that dissatisfied citizens have fewer open channels and more readily express their anger on anonymous forums. The Ministry of Home Affairs’ formulation that the state will act against incitement “from any quarter” shows that this securitisation is designed to be symmetrical, placing the state as referee above all currents rather than as the backer of any one of them. The following table summarises the map of currents together with the confidence levels of the assessments.

Why the Hard Currents Emerge, and Why They Remain Stunted: the Mudde Test

The question “why” requires a layered answer. The first layer is structural: Singapore’s economic openness demands large inflows of foreign labour. The Peaceful but Distant study cites Ministry of Manpower data showing 1,655,900 foreign workers in June 2026, so that competition for jobs, housing and public space is an everyday experience, not an abstraction. The second layer is ideological and paradoxical: the narrative of vulnerability taught by the state since 1984 instils vigilance against threats, and when the threat is no longer depicted as foreign soldiers but as competing newcomers, defensive nationalism can shift into nativism. This is what Lim captured as the emergence of popular nationalism after 2011. The third layer is the tension within meritocracy that Tan foresaw in 2008: when rewards are concentrated and inequality widens, an anxious middle class looks for scapegoats outside, and professional newcomers become a visible target. The fourth layer is a moral conservatism legitimised by the state itself through the Shared Values and the definition of the traditional family, so that religious groups feel they are defending official doctrine when they resist change. The fifth layer is the globalisation of the online extremist ecosystem, from the Christchurch manifesto to the Atomwaffen subculture, which reaches Singaporean teenagers without any need for local organisation, and is aggravated by the conflicts in the Middle East, as the 2026 threat report notes.

Why do these currents remain stunted? The Mudde test gives a sharp answer. The element of nativism is present, especially in online discourse and the anti-CECA campaign. The element of authoritarianism, that is, the demand for order and harsh punishment, is already fulfilled by the state itself; there is no room for a challenger promising more order than the most orderly state in the region. The element of populism, that is, the cleavage between a pure people and a corrupt elite, is weak because of the state’s reputation for integrity and because the main opposition has chosen the moderate language of a check rather than anti-elite language. A party categorised as populist, such as Peoples Voice, won only 2.37 per cent of the national vote in 2020. The result is a configuration that can be called nativism without a radical-right party. Chua Beng Huat helps explain why: state communitarianism has absorbed social conservatism into official doctrine, so the radical right loses its monopoly over the values of family and nation. Rodan adds that consultative channels of participation draw off grievances before they become contestation, and George shows that citizens trade part of their freedom for tangible comfort.

This conclusion does not mean the hard currents can be ignored. It means that they work differently from the European radical right. Rather than building parties, they press their agenda through amplified online opinion, push the government to tighten foreign-labour policy, and occasionally penetrate mid-sized opposition parties in the form of rhetoric. Rather than building a street movement, moral conservatism chose the path of lobbying and obtained a constitutional result in the form of Article 156. Rather than building militias, far-right extremism appears as solitary teenagers in front of a screen. The three also differ in their targets: nativism targets Indian and PRC newcomers and migrant workers, moral conservatism targets changes in sexual norms, and violent extremism targets Muslims and Malays. There is no single “ultra camp” uniting the three. This assessment is given Medium to High confidence: High for the absence of a significant radical-right party, Medium for the mechanism of absorption, since the causal relationship between state ideology and the stunting of the hard currents is inferential.

What the Leaders Say

The voices of Singapore’s leaders show how the state draws boundaries for the currents above. On moral conservatism, Lee Hsien Loong at the National Day Rally of 21 August 2022, as quoted by the Malay Mail, said: “I believe this is the right thing to do, and something that most Singaporeans will now accept”, before affirming that “marriage should be between a man and a woman” and that the state would protect that definition from challenge in the courts. These sentences show the characteristic PAP compromise: loosening the criminal law while locking family norms into the constitution. On nativism, Lawrence Wong on 14 September 2021 judged that the PSP motion on CECA had “strong racist and xenophobic undertones” and asked the party to “refrain from exploiting Singaporeans’ anxieties for your own political gain”. After the racist attack of May 2021, Minister Grace Fu wrote “Racism is unacceptable. So is xenophobia”, while Lee Hsien Loong stated that there was no place for such behaviour in Singapore.

On identity politics and foreign interference, a PTI report carried by The Week entitled Singapore’s multiracial ideals still ‘work in progress’: Minister Shanmugam (14 October 2025) recorded K. Shanmugam warning that if future leaders embraced identity politics, that path would be a “one-way street to ruin”, and that Singapore was no more stable than other countries had been before communal relations there deteriorated. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in its response to PAS, insisted that “It is not for foreign entities or individuals to tell Singaporeans how to vote”. On 4 July 2026, the Malay Mail, in the report Singapore PM Lawrence Wong champions diversity in PAP ranks, recorded Wong urging young people to “widen the circle” and stressing that Singapore cannot afford polarised politics like that seen elsewhere. On Indonesia, the Malay Mail, in the report ‘It’s not right to say this’: Singapore senior minister rebukes Indonesian official’s oxygen remark (19 October 2026), recorded Shanmugam rejecting an Indonesian official’s claim that Singapore’s oxygen comes from Indonesian forests, affirming readiness to act under the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act, but also praising President Prabowo’s measures and stating that it is the Indonesian people themselves who suffer most. On the Indonesian side, Eco-Business, in the report Indonesia signals gas export curbs for countries that do not ‘respect’ it (22 October 2026), quoted Bahlil Lahadalia: “I will not hesitate to consider halting exports to countries that disrespect Indonesia”, and President Prabowo: “For certain countries that like to insult the Indonesian nation, in time we will reveal the companies.”

The Indonesian Mirror: How Singapore’s Nationalist Currents Reacted to Jakarta, October 2026

The October 2026 crisis offered a rare opportunity to test whether Singapore’s nationalist currents would turn into hostility towards Indonesia. The chronology is brief. The Independent Singapore, in the report Singaporeans urge PM Wong to do more after he announces probe into companies behind haze (16 October 2026), recorded Wong’s post of 15 October that the government was tracing the companies that might be responsible for the fires and could act under the haze law. On 21 and 22 October, Bahlil spoke of a “survival mode” and of countries that do not respect Indonesia. Mothership, in the report Indonesia to cut gas exports to Singapore (24 October 2026), recorded a cut of 31 BBTUD from 24 October, made up of 15 BBTUD from Natuna and 16 BBTUD from Sumatra, and noted that a gradual reduction had already been agreed when the contract was extended in 2022 to 2028. MustShareNews, in the report Indonesia cuts natural gas exports to S’pore by 9% (24 October 2026), quoted the Energy Market Authority as saying that the reduction amounted to less than 2 per cent of Singapore’s daily gas demand, which exceeds 1,000 BBTUD.

How did Singaporean netizens react? The open evidence available shows that anger was directed mainly at their own government and at corporations, not at the Indonesian people. The same Independent Singapore report, based on Reddit screenshots, recorded comments demanding firm action from the government, for example “Singaporeans deserve decisive action, not just statements and tokens of concern”, as well as calls for businesses profiting from the fires to be stopped; the report contained no comments attacking Indonesia as a nation. JawaPos, in the report Gara-gara Kabut Asap Indonesia, PM Singapura Disindir Warganya Sendiri [Because of Indonesia’s Haze, Singapore’s PM Mocked by His Own Citizens] (14 October 2026), citing The Online Citizen, recorded netizens’ jibes at Wong, including one comment accusing Indonesia of using the haze to pressure Singapore. This finding is consistent with the Narrative War study’s assessment that Singaporean online opinion is organic, and with the essay Ekosistem Blog Singapura‘s picture of satire and self-criticism. An essay in KBA13 Insight entitled Relasi Indonesia–Singapura: Interdependensi Ekonomi, Politik Keamanan, dan Dinamika Strategis ASEAN [Indonesia–Singapore Relations: Economic Interdependence, Security Politics and ASEAN Strategic Dynamics] has shown that relations between the two countries have always been marked by tension and dependence at once, and that the haze issue has become a matter of non-traditional security.

History offers a precedent for how the Singaporean state can invoke “public opinion” in a dispute with Jakarta. The Jakarta Post, in the report RI-Singapore row worsens (10 February 2014), recorded that in the dispute over the naming of the KRI Usman-Harun, Singapore cancelled a defence cooperation meeting on the grounds of public opinion, and Minister Tan Chuan-Jin stated that there was nothing heroic about killing innocent civilians. The reverse direction has also occurred: The Jakarta Post, in the report Singapore dismisses claims of taking advantage of Indonesia’s weakening economy (24 July 2026), recorded a counter-campaign, “Sell Singapore”, on Indonesian social media, and the reply of Minister of State Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim that online attacks did not reflect the true sentiment in bilateral relations. The assessment of this section: Singaporean nationalism towards Indonesia in October 2026 was defensive-legalistic and channelled by the state, not nativist-aggressive (Medium confidence, as there are no systematic cross-platform data). The risk to be monitored is a shift of anger from corporations to Indonesian migrant workers, given that Ferrara’s audit shows migrant workers are already targets of economically framed hate; as of 28 October 2026, no open evidence of such a shift has been found (Low confidence on the risk, Medium on the absence of evidence). For Jakarta, the most important lesson is that the rhetoric of “respect” and “survival mode” tends to reinforce Singapore’s narrative of vulnerability and rally citizens behind the PAP, not weaken it.

Counterarguments, Scenarios to 2030, and Recommendations

At least four counterarguments need to be weighed. First, some observers will say that the Singaporean state itself is ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative. This argument contains a partial truth: the state is indeed communitarian, conservative on family matters, and very quick to securitise identity. But the label “ultra” misleads, because the same state repealed Section 377A, maintains constitutional multiracialism, and openly acts against xenophobia; the more accurate term is pragmatic state conservatism. Second, some argue that the small electoral figures conceal suppressed hard currents that could explode. The argument is valid as a warning, since surveys can be affected by the tendency to conceal unpopular views, and the amplification of anti-CECA hate shows energy that has not yet been channelled; but there is no open evidence of underground organisations awaiting their moment. Third, the far-right cases could be read as the beginning of a movement. ISD data, however, show a pattern of individuals loosely connected in cyberspace, such as the contact between the 17-year-old and Nick Lee, rather than a movement structure; even so, such contacts are early indicators that must be monitored. Fourth, some of the survey data were collected online and some of the media data are in English, so the views of Mandarin-, Malay- and Tamil-speaking communities may be under-represented; Ferrara’s cross-lingual audit partly closes this gap.

The first scenario is the most likely because all the mechanisms of absorption are still working and the PAP has just renewed its mandate. The second scenario becomes more likely if the cost of living remains the main issue and mid-sized opposition parties are tempted to use anti-newcomer language to reach young voters. The third scenario could be triggered by new legal challenges over family rights or the curriculum, while the fourth depends heavily on the behaviour of Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. The fifth scenario has a low probability thanks to the ISD’s early-detection capacity and peer reporting, but its impact on communal harmony would be very large. On that basis, recommendations are addressed to named actors. To Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs and its digital authorities: extend the rehabilitation and peer-reporting approach to the online gaming ecosystem, such as Roblox, which now appears in ISD releases, and publish aggregate data on the use of restraining orders under the racial harmony law so that securitisation remains subject to public oversight. To the WP, the PSP and other opposition parties: adopt an internal code of conduct that separates criticism of labour policy from racial language, as Pritam Singh proposed in 2021 through data transparency. To the IPS and Singapore’s universities: extend sentiment audits to HardwareZone and TikTok, and draw a firm distinction between political conservatism and moral conservatism in survey publications.

To Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore: distinguish explicitly in public communication between the policies of the Singaporean government, the corporations linked to the fires, and Singaporean citizens, because the data show that Singaporeans criticise their own government more; and strengthen consular protection for Indonesian migrant workers as a preventive step in case online anger shifts its target. To Indonesian officials and influencers: avoid language that can be read as an existential threat, such as claims about oxygen or “countries that insult us”, because such language supplies material for securitisation to Singapore’s narrative of vulnerability. An essay in KBA13 Insight entitled Islamophobia in Indonesia’s Cyberspace: Politics, Buzzers, and Virtual Fear depicts buzzers (paid social-media amplifiers) as cyber-militias that live off selling narratives of fear, and the essay Pasca 25 Agustus 2025: Operasi Wacana, Influencer, dan Perang Informasi di Medsos [After 25 August 2025: Discourse Operations, Influencers and Information Warfare on Social Media] notes how difficult it is to identify a single mastermind behind a wave of information; both lessons apply equally to the war of discourse across the strait. To ASEAN and the regional mechanisms on transboundary haze pollution: shift the haze dispute into a credible technical mechanism so that the environmental issue does not keep fuelling nationalism on both sides of the strait.

Limitations and Conclusion

This brief has a number of limitations that should be stated plainly. Data on the HardwareZone forum and TikTok are not systematically available in open sources, so the assessment of online space rests on Ferrara’s audit covering Facebook, Reddit and YouTube, with its author’s own caveat that inter-model agreement on the hard sample was only about κ 0.42. The 2026 Terrorism Threat Assessment Report was read through media coverage, not the original document. The “Conservative” cluster in the IPS survey measures political preference, not morality, and this brief has no dedicated survey of Singaporeans’ attitudes towards Indonesia. Most sources are in English, so the voices of Mandarin-, Malay- and Tamil-speaking communities may be under-represented. Finally, the October 2026 crisis is still unfolding, so the assessment in Section XIII needs to be reviewed whenever there is a new trigger, especially MSCI’s decision in 2027 and the expiry of the gas contract in 2028. Claims that could not be verified, including Pink Dot attendance figures after 2014 and the size of far-right online communities in Singapore, have deliberately been left out.

For all these limitations, the core conclusion of this brief is fairly robust. Singapore has hard currents, but not in the form imagined by the initial question. Economic nativism is real and amplified online, especially against Indian newcomers associated with CECA, newcomers from the PRC, and migrant workers; but it has no strong party. Moral-religious conservatism is broad and institutionalised, but it chose the legal route and obtained a constitutional result, so it cannot properly be called ultra. Far-right extremism is truly extreme in ideological terms, but it is present as the isolated and ever younger self-radicalisation of teenagers, with Muslims and Malays as its main targets. The China factor moves in two directions: criticism of Chinese bias in the nation-building project, state surveillance of PRC influence, and local nativism against PRC newcomers. The liberal-progressive current is growing but constrained by regulation. Above all of these stands a communitarian state that occupies the ideological space of the right, turns identity issues into security issues, and makes itself the referee over every current.

For relations with Indonesia, the implications are twofold. On the one hand, there is no organised Singaporean ultra-nationalist current ready to push its government towards confrontation; netizens’ reactions in October 2026 mostly demanded firmness from their own government and corporate accountability. On the other hand, the narrative of vulnerability at the heart of state ideology will grow stronger every time Jakarta speaks in the language of threat, and in that climate Singapore’s legalism will harden, not soften. An essay in KBA13 Insight entitled Singapura di Selat Melaka: Konsentrasi Fungsi, Asimetri Kekuasaan, dan Risiko Eskalasi Kawasan [Singapore in the Strait of Malacca: Concentration of Functions, Power Asymmetry and the Risk of Regional Escalation] (2026) reminds us that the concentration of functions yields efficiency in normal times but becomes a single point of failure in times of crisis; the same logic applies to the city-state’s ideology. Singapore’s ordered sky is not a sky without clouds, but a sky whose clouds are constantly measured, mapped and controlled. Understanding how that control works is far more useful for Indonesian diplomacy than imagining an ultra camp that, on the available evidence, never truly took shape.